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INTRODUCTION**
** Just days before this Comment went to print and after nearly three years of
delays, the SEC approved final rules to implement crowdfunding. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed.
Reg. 71,388 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249,
269, and 274). These final rules will become effective 180 days after publication in the
Federal Register. SEC Adopts Rules To Permit Crowdfunding, SEC (Oct. 30, 2015),
http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-249.html [http://perma.cc/UB2A-CLZ7].
This Comment proceeds from the premise that North Carolina should use the
intrastate exemption to the Jumpstart Our Business Start-Ups Act to take advantage of
the economic benefits of crowdfunding, even in the absence of rules enabling
crowdfunding on a national scale. Jumpstart Our Business Start-Ups Act, Pub. L. No. 112106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012). Despite the recent passage of these rules, intrastate
crowdfunding exemptions remain highly attractive financing alternatives for North
Carolina’s entrepreneurs seeking to raise capital under a less burdensome regulatory
regime. See J.D. Alois, Vote No: Commissioner Piwowar Dissents on Crowdfunding & Rule
147 Rules, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Oct. 30, 2015, 1:43 PM), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com
/2015/10/76576-vote-no-commissioner-piwowar-dissents-on-crowdfunding-rule-147-rules/
[http://perma.cc/2BC5-NC9M] (arguing that the SEC’s final rules “engender a complex
web of provisions and need for additional compliance that will prove costly for smaller
issuers”).
For instance, state exemptions can attract issuers by providing for relaxed,
streamlined rules, which impose fewer costs on issuers. For example, where the federal
regulation requires audited financial statements for issuers seeking $500,000 or more,
Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,412–13, the proposed state rule would not require
audited financial statements unless an issuer sought to raise more than $1,000,000. See
infra Section IV.A.1. States can also provide for less burdensome disclosure requirements.
Compare Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,398–418 (requiring disclosure of the names of
directors, officers, and substantial shareholders; the issuer’s business plan; the issuer’s
financial condition; the purpose and use of the proceeds; the target offering amount; the
offering price of shares or a valuation calculation; and a description of the issuer’s
ownership and capital structure), with infra Section VI.D (describing a proposal to
standardize disclosure and limit complex information to better fit the needs of investors
and issuers). Further, North Carolina, like other states, may allow issuers to raise more
money than that permitted under the federal rules. Compare Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg.
at 71,391–95, with infra Section VI.A. Moreover, by passing a state exemption and
allowing its entrepreneurs an alternate avenue to crowdfund capital, North Carolina can
keep pace with the fourteen other states that offer their residents a more attractive
crowdfunding regime than available under the federal rules. Compare infra Sections IV.B
and V.A (describing North Carolina’s failure to pass a crowdfunding bill despite broad,
bipartisan support and discussing the benefits that equity crowdfunding can bring to the
state), with infra notes 98–111 and accompanying text (noting other state statutes
authorizing intrastate crowdfunding).
Finally, the intrastate exemption remains attractive from a public policy standpoint,
as the states are better positioned both to regulate smaller, local projects and to serve as
valuable experimental laboratories for the federal government. See infra Section V.C.
With regards to the mechanics of crowdfunding, the states should be able to react more
quickly than the SEC to implement necessary changes and streamline their crowdfunding
regimes. Jonathan R. Macey, The Distorting Incentives Facing the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 666 (2010) (explaining that the
“SEC appears to be at the outer‐range of federal agencies both in terms of the extent to
which it is dominated by lawyers and the extent to which its operation is paralyzed by
bureaucracy.”); see also Mark Hatch, Opinion: SEC Bureaucracy is Threatening to Quash
an Innovation Renaissance, WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com
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In 1994, when Internet usage was growing astronomically,1 thirtyyear-old Jeff Bezos quit his Wall Street job to start an online retail
company out of his garage.2 Bezos’ parents provided him with a large
portion of their life savings—“a few hundred thousand dollars”—to
launch his startup, despite what he described as a seventy percent
chance of losing the entire investment.3 Within two months, Bezos’s
sales were as high as $20,000 per week, which allowed him to acquire
venture capital just one year later.4 Bezos’s startup has since become
the world’s largest online retailer—Amazon.com—with annual
revenues totaling $61 billion.5 Although inspirational “garage-to/business/on-small-business/opinion-sec-bureaucracy-is-threatening-to-quash-aninnovation-renaissance/2012/09/07/1ce2cc88-f6ae-11e1-8253-3f495ae70650_story.html
[https://perma.cc/UP9Q-5CZZ].
Additionally, the SEC has proposed amendments to SEC Rule 147 to make intrastate
crowdfunding more attractive to issuers. Currently, SEC Rule 147 creates a safe harbor for
qualifying intrastate offerings under section 3(a)(11) of the Securities Act of 1933. 17
C.F.R. § 230.147(a) (2015). In addition to issuing final crowdfunding rules, the SEC also
proposed an amendment to relax Rule 147 and to provide that the rule would no longer
operate as a safe harbor for conducting a valid intrastate exemption under section 3(a)(11)
of the Securities Act. See Exemptions To Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities
Offerings, 80 Fed. Reg. 69,786, 69,799 (Nov. 10, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230).
Instead, the amended Rule 147 would operate as a separate exemption for intrastate
crowdfunding offerings. Id. at 69,788. The rules would allow an issuer to make offers
accessible to out-of-state residents and to be incorporated out of state, so long as sales are
made only to in-state residents, the issuer’s principal place of business is in state, and the
issuer satisfies at least one additional requirement that further demonstrates the in-state
nature of the issuer’s business. Id. at 69,788–89. The proposed amendment would retain
the eighty percent threshold for “doing business in-state.” Id. at 69,790–91. Additionally,
the proposed amendment to Rule 147 would also allow state laws to permit issuers to raise
up to $5 million in a twelve-month period. Id. at 69,791. Moreover, the proposed rule
would relax the requirement that “offers and sales of securities . . . [are] made only to
persons resident within the state or territory” in lieu of a less restrictive standard such that
the issuer could satisfy the requirement “by establishing that the issuer had a reasonable
belief that the purchaser of the securities in the offering was a resident of such state or
territory[.]” Id. at 69,792–93. Finally, the proposed rule would amend the resale restriction
to provide that “for a period of nine months from the date of the sale by the issuer of a
security sold pursuant to this rule, any resale of such security by a purchaser shall be made
only to persons within such state or territory . . . .” Id. at 69,794. This would open up the
door for an intrastate secondary market, as described in Section VI.G of this Comment,
and further, provide for the potential ability of secondary sales to out-of-state purchasers.
See id. Thus, the proposed amendments to Rule 147 along with the SEC’s new
crowdfunding regulations mean that intrastate crowdfunding in North Carolina not only
remains a viable option but should be even more attractive than before.
1. Amazon Startup Story, FUNDABLE, https://www.fundable.com/learn/startup-stories
/amazon [http://perma.cc/23GL-3SBE]. In 1994, web-usage was growing at 2,300% per year.
Id.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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riches” startup stories like Amazon’s tend to dominate the media,6
they are rare exceptions. In fact, small businesses and startups are
defined largely by struggles and failures, which mostly go
unmentioned. Even in the land of opportunity, small businesses and
startups often fail because capital is scarce and investors are risk
averse. Like Bezos, entrepreneurs need startup capital—often large
sums of it—to launch their businesses. But convincing investors to
commit large sums of money to investments that pose a high risk of
failure is extremely challenging.
Equity crowdfunding allows entrepreneurs to solicit many small,
individual investments in exchange for equity securities without
having to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”).7 Before Congress passed the “Jumpstart Our Business
Startups” (“JOBS”) Act in 2012,8 equity crowdfunding was only an
idea in the United States. While the SEC drags its feet, failing to
promulgate rules to implement the equity crowdfunding exemption,
several pioneering states have passed their own intrastate
crowdfunding exemptions.9 North Carolina nearly became one such
pioneer, but its equity crowdfunding exemption failed despite
overwhelming bipartisan support.10 Many North Carolina legislators
consider unacceptable the abandonment of efforts to bring equity
crowdfunding to North Carolina.11 Indeed, North Carolina State Rep.

6. For example, many have heard the story of how in 1923, Missouri-born cartoonist
Walt Disney moved to Los Angeles, California, where he spent months working out of his
uncle’s garage to produce animated short films. See Jennie Cohen, Great American Garage
Entrepreneurs, HISTORY (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.history.com/news/great-american-garageentrepreneurs [http://perma.cc/5CSF-HNCZ]. Disney’s small startup has since become the
world’s largest media conglomerate—The Walt Disney Company. Id. Other “garage-toriches” companies include Apple, Inc., Hewlett Packard, Google, Mattel, and the Yankee
Candle Company. Id.
7. See, e.g., Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,428 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, and 249) (“[T]he [crowdfunding] proposal would
exempt securities sold pursuant to Section 4(a)(6) from the registration requirements of
Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.”).
8. Jumpstart Our Business Start-Ups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012)
[hereinafter JOBS Act] (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
9. See infra notes 98–111 (identifying fourteen states that have passed their own
intrastate crowdfunding exemptions).
10. The original crowdfunding bill passed the North Carolina House by a vote of 103
to 1. See House Bill 680, N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts
/BillLookUp/BillLookUp.pl?Session=2013&BillID=H680 [http://perma.cc/3UMT-L5GP];
Intrastate Crowdfunding Is Officially Dead in North Carolina—for Now, N.C. JOBS ACT
BLOG (Aug. 19, 2014), http://www.jobsnc.blogspot.com/2014/08/intrastate-crowdfundingis-officially.html [http://perma.cc/2B73-UKHP].
11. Rick Smith, Crowdfunding Killed in N.C.; Bill Backer Criticizes Senate Strategy,
CROWDFUNDBEAT (Aug. 20, 2014), http://crowdfundbeat.com/2014/08/18/crowdfunding-

94 N.C. L. REV. 276 (2015)

2015]

EQUITY CROWDFUNDING IN N.C.

281

W.A. Wilkins intimated that such efforts were just beginning: “We
can do better. Let’s kill this thing and do better.”12 By failing to pass
an equity crowdfunding exemption, North Carolina forgoes
tremendous potential benefits—including economic growth, job
growth, and renewed innovation—at minimal cost to taxpayers.13
Thus, a North Carolina crowdfunding exemption deserves another
attempt.
This Comment argues that a successful crowdfunding exemption
must strike a reasonable regulatory balance that both minimizes costs
and burdens on small businesses and startups and protects investors
from undue loss, fraud, and abuse. This balance would be
appropriately achieved under a crowdfunding exemption that
preserves many of the key provisions in the failed North Carolina bill,
including: (1) prescribing reasonable target-offering limits and limits
on the aggregate contributions of individual investors to curb
potential investor losses, while still providing issuers with significant
capital bases to support their startups; (2) requiring disclosures
triggered by target-offering limits that reasonably enable investors to
make fully informed investments, while minimizing burdens and costs
for smaller issuers; and (3) retaining the failed North Carolina JOBS
Act’s “all-or-nothing” provision,14 which prevents investor losses in
undercapitalized companies while incentivizing issuers to be more
responsive to investor concerns and to engage in more diligent
planning.
A prudent crowdfunding exemption could also improve upon the
failed bill. First, this Comment proposes eliminating unnecessary or
overly burdensome disclosures in lieu of simpler, standardized
disclosures. Second, mandating investor education requirements will
help investors to understand those disclosures. Third, promoting
competition among intermediaries will not only incentivize them to
offer issuers better services but will also encourage them to compete
to feature the best companies on their websites and to adequately
screen issuers to prevent fraud and reduce investor losses. Fourth, to
further incentivize the screening of potential issuers, a crowdfunding
exemption should require intermediaries to absorb some loss in the
killed-in-nc-bill-backer-criticizes-senate-strategy/ [http://perma.cc/Q99G-ZH8B] (quoting
Representative Wilkins).
12. Id.
13. See Intrastate Crowdfunding Is Officially Dead in North Carolina—for Now, supra
note 10.
14. An Act To Enact the Jump-Start Our Business Start-Ups Act and To Enact the
New Markets Job Act of 2014, H.B. 680, sec. 2, § 78(a), 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(N.C. 2013) [hereinafter H.B. 680]; see infra Section VI.C.
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event of fraud. Fifth, requiring intermediaries to maintain social
networking features on their funding portals will facilitate
communication between issuers and investors. Finally, loosening the
resale restriction by vesting intermediaries with discretion to establish
interportal, intrastate secondary markets for crowdfunded securities
will provide for more accurate securities valuation and also provide
investors with more adequate securities fraud remedies.
This Comment proceeds in six parts. Part I discusses the
inadequacy of current capital-raising mechanisms available to
entrepreneurs. Part II introduces the various forms of crowdfunding
available to issuers. Part III highlights several key provisions of the
recently passed federal JOBS Act. Part IV discusses North Carolina’s
attempt to implement its own intrastate equity crowdfunding
exemption, House Bill 680, and the consequences of the bill’s failure.
Part V argues that the benefits of an equity crowdfunding exemption
outweigh the drawbacks, which can be addressed by appropriate
regulation. Finally, Part VI proposes provisions for a new North
Carolina JOBS Act with a focus on minimizing unnecessary costs and
burdens on small businesses and startups while protecting investors
from loss, fraud, and abuse.
I. RAISING BUSINESS CAPITAL WITHOUT CROWDFUNDING
Because small businesses are the largest contributors to U.S. job
growth, stimulating small businesses and promoting entrepreneurship
is a logical formula for growing the American economy.15
Unfortunately, small businesses tend to fail quickly,16 often due to
capital shortages.17 Indeed, lack of access to capital is a major obstacle
to starting a business.18

15. See Karen Gordon Mills & Brady McCarthy, The State of Small Business Lending:
Credit Access During the Recovery and How Technology May Change the Game 3–4
(Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 15-004, 2014), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty
/Publication%20Files/15-004_09b1bf8b-eb2a-4e63-9c4e-0374f770856f.pdf [http://perma.cc
/ES9U-MWWP] (explaining that small businesses employ “half of the private sector
workforce” and create “two out of every three net new jobs” in the United States).
16. Small Business Advisory: Crowdfunding, NASAA (2013), http://www.nasaa.org
/13676/small-business-advisory-crowdfunding/ [http://perma.cc/D96X-64KW] (“[R]oughly
50 percent of all small businesses fail within the first five years . . . .”).
17. Sara Hanks & Andrew Stephenson, Online Securities Offerings, 33 BANKING &
FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP., Feb. 2014, at 1, 1.
18. Howard E. Van Auken, Obstacles to Business Launch, 4 J. DEV.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 175, 180–81 (1999); see also Remarks on Signing the Jumpstart Our
Business Startups Act, 2012 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 249 (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.gpo
.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201200249/pdf/DCPD-201200249.pdf [http://perma.cc/B5Y7-7HDJ]
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Startups and small businesses have few viable financing options.
First, entrepreneurs can finance a business through credit card debt.19
Small businesses that use credit cards to meet their financing needs
probably hope that either their cash flows will sufficiently grow to
service their credit-card balances, or that they will eventually be able
to refinance the debt at a lower interest rate.20 Neither expectation
takes into account the low success rate of small businesses,21 which
means that the entrepreneur has a good chance of being personally
liable for the debt. Moreover, credit cards are not a sustainable source
of business capital because of relatively low credit limits22 that restrict
a business’s potential growth.23
As an alternative to credit cards, some fortunate entrepreneurs,
like Bezos,24 can solicit friends and family for startup cash.25 This
option is unrealistic for most entrepreneurs because it requires that
the entrepreneur have family members who have the means and are
willing to risk their investment on the entrepreneur’s ideas.
(“[N]o matter how good [entrepreneurs’] ideas are, if [they] can’t get a loan from a bank
or backing from investors, it’s almost impossible to get their businesses off the ground.”).
19. In a recent survey, credit cards were the preferred financing choice for small
businesses, as thirty-seven percent of respondents indicated that they used credit cards to
meet their financing needs, second only to revolving lines of credit from banks. NAT’L
SMALL BUS. ASS’N, SMALL BUSINESS ACCESS TO CAPITAL SURVEY 4 (2012), http://www
.nsba.biz/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Access-to-Capital-Survey.pdf [http://perma.cc/L58C9QGB].
20. See, e.g., Karen E. Klein, Advice for a Business Haunted by Decade-Old Credit Card
Debt, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-03-03
/advice-for-a-business-haunted-by-decade-old-credit-card-debt
[http://perma.cc/F7NX9LFF]. For some, the risk has proven worth the gamble. Consider Kevin Plank, who
started successful athletic apparel manufacturer Under Armour with a whopping $40,000
in credit card debt and $20,000 of his own savings. See Mark Riddix, 6 Entrepreneurs Who
Built Their Fortunes from Nothing, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www
.investopedia.com/financial-edge/0411/6-entrepreneurs-who-built-their-fortunes-fromnothing.aspx [http://perma.cc/ZP37-3A7Y]. Since then, Plank has amassed a net worth of
$500 million. Id.
21. See Small Business Advisory: Crowdfunding, supra note 16.
22. See, e.g., Credit Limits, CITIGROUP, https://www.citicards.com/cards/wv/html/cm
/know-the-rules/how-credit-cards-work/credit-limits.html [http://perma.cc/ZG83-UXZC]
(explaining that creditors limit the credit available).
23. Credit card rates can be “as low as 11 percent or as high as 26 percent. The
national average is currently 14.96 percent. For example, Wells Fargo’s Cash Back card
offers a zero percent introductory rate to new customers. After 12 months, the variable
Annual Percentage Rate, or APR, kicks in and your rate could climb to anywhere
between 12.15 and 25.99 percent.” Zelkadis Evli, Why Are Credit Card Interest Rates So
High?, YAHOO! FIN. (Oct. 11, 2013, 1:45 PM), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/just-explainit/why-credit-card-interest-rates-high-132648813.html [http://perma.cc/CM9J-SH9K].
24. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.
25. For example, Sam Walton opened his first Wal-Mart store with $25,000, of which
$20,000 was contributed by his father-in-law. See Riddix, supra note 20.
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Moreover, borrowing from friends and family may invite unwanted
meddling in the business, or worse, harm relationships with friends or
family.26
Most commonly, though, small businesses can apply for a bank
loan or line of credit.27 Historically, small community banks have
been the most frequent lenders to small businesses.28 But small
business lending has declined steadily since 1998.29 The financial crisis
of 2008, which caused widespread bank failures and consolidation,30
aggravated the decline.31 Further, reactive legislation has subjected
banks to more rigorous regulatory scrutiny, heightened capital
requirements, and higher lending standards.32 The resulting
regulatory environment and economic uncertainty have caused many
banks to tighten their lending requirements.33
Despite recent loosening of post-recession lending standards,
access to credit for small businesses remains below pre-recession
26. Borrowing from Friends and Family, ENTREPRENEUR (Aug. 16, 2006), http://www
.entrepreneur.com/article/24334 [http://perma.cc/DK54-FNMB] (citing START YOUR OWN
BUSINESS: THE ONLY START-UP BOOK YOU’LL EVER NEED 183–88 (Riva Lesonsky ed.,
2d ed. 2001)).
27. NAT’L SMALL BUS. ASS’N, supra note 19, at 4 (showing revolving lines of credit
and bank loans as the first and fourth most common forms of financing, respectively).
28. TANYA D. MARSH & JOSEPH W. NORMAN, AM. ENTER. INST., THE IMPACT OF
DODD-FRANK ON COMMUNITY BANKS 12 (2013), http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads
/2013/05/-the-impact-of-doddfrank-on-community-banks_164334553537.pdf [http://perma
.cc/9L43-7TAX] (“[One dollar] out of every $2 lent to small businesses comes from
community banks.”).
29. A recent study indicated that nonfarm, nonresidential loans of less than $1
million—“a common proxy for small business lending”—dropped from 51% to 29% since
1998. Ann Marie Wiersch & Scott Shane, Why Small Business Lending Isn’t What It Used
To Be, FED. RES. BANK CLEVELAND (Aug. 14, 2013), https://www.clevelandfed
.org/en/newsroom-and-events/publications/economic-commentary/2013-economiccommentaries/ec-201310-why-small-business-lending-isnt-what-it-used-to-be.aspx
[https://perma.cc/T9EW-KBFH]. Reasons for this are numerous and include lower
creditworthiness among small businesses, lower demand for small-business loans, and
heightened lending standards resulting from stricter lending regulation. Id.
30. See Mills & McCarthy, supra note 15, at 36.
31. See generally id. (describing both secular and cyclical trends causing reduced
small-business lending). According to the Small Business Administration (“SBA”), from
2008 to 2011, small business lending declined almost 18%; small commercial and industrial
lending declined by 20%. REBEL A. COLE, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., HOW DID THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS AFFECT SMALL BUSINESS LENDING IN THE UNITED STATES? 2 (2012),
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/rs399tot.pdf [http://perma.cc/3J43-Y9TK].
32. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 616, 124 Stat. 1376, 1615 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1844(b) (2013))
(requiring capital requirements to be countercyclical); 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i) (2013)
(mandating annual and semi-annual stress tests by the Federal Reserve and the banks,
respectively).
33. See Mills & McCarthy, supra note 15, at 34–35 fig.24 (showing a decreasing
average loan-to-deposit ratio since the recession).
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levels.34 The decline in small business lending by commercial banks
has forced entrepreneurs to look for alternative sources of capital,
including venture capital (“VC”) funding,35 angel investors,36 and
even public offerings of securities via initial public offerings
(“IPO”).37 However, these sources of funding are peppered with
inadequacies. They are available only to an extremely low percentage
of small businesses and often require the entrepreneur to surrender
some degree of control.38 For example, VC firms39 are highly
selective,40 often focus their efforts on a small geographic area,41 and
generally carry a higher cost of capital as compared to other avenues
for financing.42 While a venture capitalist’s financial or business
34. See id. at 24–25 figs.13–14 (showing decreased small-business loan balances and a
lower percentage of small business loans as a share of total loans since the recession).
35. Venture capital firms invest equity capital in “young, high-growth companies.”
Venture Capital, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN, http://www.sba.gov/content/venture-capital
[http://perma.cc/UEY9-GZF9]. VC firms “take higher risks in exchange for potential
higher returns” on their investments, and they also participate in managing the businesses
they invest in. Id.
36. Angel investors are generally “high net worth individuals who seek high returns
through private investment in startup companies.” Id. They also seek involvement in the
businesses that they invest in, which can be particularly helpful because angel investors
tend to invest in industries that the angel investors are particularly familiar with. Id.
37. An IPO, perhaps the most implausible means of financing a startup, allows a
company to access the capital markets to raise equity capital. See Michael S. Colo, IPO: Is
It Appropriate?, POYNER SPRUILL, http://www.poynerspruill.com/publications/Pages
/IPOIsitAppropriate.aspx [http://perma.cc/V78F-M6M2].
38. Attractive business startups that do manage to obtain VC funding are likely to
give up some control because venture capitalists actively participate in the businesses they
invest in. See Venture Capital, supra note 35. Likewise, angel investors are often former
executives of large corporations, capable of providing superior advice to entrepreneurs.
See, e.g., Tanya Prive, Angel Investors: How the Rich Invest, FORBES (Mar. 12, 2013, 9:27
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/2013/03/12/angels-investors-how-the-richinvest/ [http://perma.cc/HFP5-NWE6].
39. The majority of venture capital “comes from a group of wealthy investors,
investment banks and other financial institutions that pool such investments or
partnerships.” Venture Capital Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com
/terms/v/venturecapital.asp [http://perma.cc/JU7Y-SG9L].
40. See Dileep Rao, Why 99.5% of Entrepreneurs Should Stop Wasting Time Seeking
Venture Capital, FORBES (July 22, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dileeprao
/2013/07/22/why-99-95-of-entrepreneurs-should-stop-wasting-time-seeking-venture-capital/
[http://perma.cc/MLT3-HD7U] (noting that, according to the Small Business
Administration, only about 300 of the 600,000 businesses started each year receive venture
capital funds).
41. See Linda Brewster Stearns & Mark S. Mizruchi, Banking and Financial Markets,
in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 284, 291 (Neil J. Smelser & Richard
Swedberg eds., 2005) (“VC firms have traditionally invested in start-ups located within the
same geographic region . . . .”).
42. VC expected rates of return were a whopping 50% to 70% during a firm’s startup
stage, 40% to 60% during the “first stage,” 35% to 50% during the “second stage,” and
25% to 35% during the bridge to an IPO. See Aswath Damodaran, Valuing Young,
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expertise may be useful, many entrepreneurs are reluctant to
surrender control or compromise on their original ideas, as VC firms
often require.43 Additionally, wealthy individual investors, known as
“angel investors,” may offer funding on terms not unlike those of VC
firms.44 Finally, notwithstanding its excessive costs,45 an IPO is
available exclusively to companies with consistently high growth.46
Such potential sources of capital are often unsuitable or
unavailable to most small businesses and startups. The persistent
scarcity of adequate alternative capital-raising mechanisms continues
to handicap American small businesses and startups, undercutting
potential innovation, job creation, and the increased productivity
associated with small businesses.47

Startup, and Growth Companies: Estimation Issues and Valuation Challenges 15 tbl.2 (May
2009), http://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/pdfiles/papers/younggrowth.pdf [http://perma
.cc/69RC-VGFP]. Between July 1, 2011, and June 30, 2012, on the other hand, the average
interest rates for variable and fixed-rate SBA loans were 5.3% and 5.8%, respectively.
FITSMALLBUSINESS, GUIDE TO SBA LOAN INTEREST RATES 21 (Feb. 21, 2014),
http://www.slideshare.net/FitSmallBusiness/guide-to-sba-loan-interest-rates
[http://perma
.cc/DN3C-NSTT].
43. See, e.g., 4 Common Venture Capital Myths, ENTREPRENEUR (Dec. 1, 2009),
http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/204198 [http://perma.cc/PE8H-7GB8] (explaining
that VC firms assume substantial control, including veto rights on investments,
acquisitions, and mergers).
44. See, e.g., Getting Started with Angel Investing, ENTREPRENEUR, http://www
.entrepreneur.com/article/52742 [http://perma.cc/2RZ7-7TP7]. Notably, angel-funded
firms have a much greater chance of survival compared to other firms. See William R.
Kerr, Josh Learner & Antoinette Schoar, The Consequences of Entrepreneurial Finance: A
Regression Discontinuity Analysis 5 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 10-086, 2010),
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/10-086.pdf [https://perma.cc/RQ3H-QDZX].
Because angel investors typically enjoy unique approval among other investors, angelfunded firms are more likely to raise capital above and beyond that provided by the
original angel investor. See id.
45. The substantial costs of an IPO, including paying lawyers, accountants, investment
banking firms, and registering and reporting to the SEC, may exceed a firm’s entire
offering target. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, CONSIDERING GOING PUBLIC? THE
COSTS OF GOING AND BEING PUBLIC MAY SURPRISE YOU 1 (2012), http://www.pwc.com
/en_us/us/transaction-services/publications/assets/pwc-cost-of-ipo.pdf [http://perma.cc/A9KQ
-LEKW].
46. Generally, IPO candidates are those that have had growing sales and net income
for at least three to five years prior to the IPO. See Colo, supra note 37. Of course, most
startups and young small businesses lack the requisite stability or operating history
required for a successful IPO. See id.
47. See Yasser Killawi, Preserving an Entrepreneurial America: How Restrictive
Immigration Policies Stifle the Creation and Growth of Startups and Small Businesses, 8
OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 129, 131 (2013).
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II. WHAT ABOUT CROWDFUNDING?
Crowdfunding, a fusion of crowdsourcing and microlending,48
provides startups and small companies with access to a much larger
pool of investors than traditional forms of financing.49 Crowdfunding
connects entrepreneurs with financiers of all levels of wealth and
sophistication. In the crowdfunding model, many investors
individually contribute a small amount of money to the business,
limiting each investor’s risk and collectively allowing the business to
meet its funding goal.50
Sites like Kickstarter,51 Indiegogo,52 and GoFundMe53 have
paved the way for crowdfunding to blossom into a viable financing
tool in the United States. However, crowdfunding’s origins long
predate the Internet. In 1885, publishing mogul Joseph Pulitzer used
“the crowd” to pay for the Statue of Liberty’s pedestal.54 France
offered America the Statue of Liberty so long as America provided
the pedestal upon which the statue would rest.55 Through a
newspaper, Pulitzer urged the American people to raise the money.56
In just five months, 160,000 investors contributed $101,091 of the
48. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 1, 27 (2012) (“Crowdfunding is a merger of two distinct antecedents:
crowdsourcing and microfinance.”). In 2005, Kiva, a microlending portal, opened for
business. See History, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/about/history#2005 [http://perma.cc
/3NGT-2923]. Kiva allows users to lend to entrepreneurs in poor, global communities who
do not have access to traditional credit. See About Us, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/about
[http://perma.cc/6G4H-PFR9]. Individuals can contribute as little as twenty-five dollars to
an entrepreneur of their choice and receive interest payments in return. Id. For example,
in 2014, Kiva funded a $100,000 loan to a manufacturer of eco-friendly beauty products,
creating three hundred new jobs in Haiti. Kreyol Essence, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/lend
/722883 [http://perma.cc/4KZZ-7SU2]. As of October 2015, Kiva has loaned $762,769,675,
funding 1,762,672 borrowers via 1,342,537 lenders. Statistics, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org
/about/stats [http://perma.cc/98H2-5MQW (dark archive)].
49. See supra Part I.
50. See Bradford, supra note 48, at 27–29 (“Crowdfunding is just a combination of
[crowdsourcing and micro-lending]—small contributions from a large number of people to
fund small entrepreneurial ventures.”).
51. What Is Kickstarter?, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/hello?ref=footer
[http://perma.cc/AR4M-A6G7] (providing a platform where “backers” can provide funds
for startups in exchange for “rewards”).
52. How It Works, INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/learn-how-to-raise-moneyfor-a-campaign [http://perma.cc/9H6Z-6KX7].
53. Common Questions, GOFUNDME, https://www.gofundme.com/questions/ [https://
perma.cc/R52R-W39L].
54. The Statue of Liberty: A Pioneering Example of Crowdfunding, COTEC (Mar. 3, 2014),
https://www.actbycotec.com/en/media.104/articles.168/the_statue_of_liberty_a_pioneering
_example_of_crowdfunding.a528.html [http://perma.cc/ZSG2-3EF3].
55. Id.
56. Id.
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$250,000 cost for Lady Liberty’s pedestal (approximately $6.3 million
today).57 Seventy-five percent of the donations were under one
dollar.58
An early example of Internet crowdfunding occurred in 1997,
when the British rock band Marillion raised $60,000 from its U.S. fan
base to help finance its North American tour.59 Since then, four types
of online crowdfunding have emerged: debt-based crowdfunding,
donation-based crowdfunding, rewards-based crowdfunding, and
equity crowdfunding.60 Debt-based, or “peer-to-peer” (“P2P”)
crowdfunding emerged in the United States in 2006.61 P2P lending
sites allow individuals to apply for unsecured loans, financed by
individual investors who earn interest on each loan.62 In 2010,
GoFundMe began offering donation-based crowdfunding, where
users solicit donations for charitable causes or personal goals or
needs.63 Rewards-based crowdfunding—perhaps the most popular of
the varieties of crowdfunding—was first offered in 2008 by
Indiegogo64 and then in 2009 by Kickstarter.65 Rewards-based
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See Tim Masters, Marillion “Understood Where the Internet Was Going Early On”,
BBC (Aug. 31, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-23881382 [http://perma
.cc/QU8M-Z8G5] (“Inspired by [the fans who crowdfunded Marillion’s 1997 North
American tour], the band turned the tables in 2001 and asked fans to pre-order an album
12 months before release. Some 12,000 signed up to finance the recording, resulting in the
album Anoraknophobia.”).
60. Types of Crowdfunding, FUNDABLE, https://www.fundable.com/crowdfunding101
/types-of-crowdfunding [http://perma.cc/ZC5P-SNB2].
61. Judd Hollas, Is Crowdfunding Now a Threat to Traditional Finance?, CORP. FIN.
REV., July–Aug. 2013, at 27, 30.
62. In October 2014, average interest rates as posted on Lending Club, the largest P2P
lender in the world, ranged from 7.64% for prime loans, to 22.53% for riskier loans.
Lending Club Statistics, LENDING CLUB, https://www.lendingclub.com/info/demand-andcredit-profile.action [http://perma.cc/Z4MQ-QXRL (dark archive)].
63. Common Questions, supra note 53. For example, when Farrah Soudani was
critically injured in the Aurora, Colorado, movie theater massacre in 2012, donations
through the site reached $171,000 in just fifteen months to pay for her medical expenses.
Help Farrah and Family—CO Theater Tragedy, GOFUNDME, http://www.gofundme.com
/Help-Farrah [http://perma.cc/5FKE-37H5].
64. See About Us, INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/about/our-story [http://perma
.cc/GL62-DVN5].
65. See Pressroom, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/press [http://perma.cc
/P35W-6BUG]. One wildly successful campaign advertised the “Pebble Smartwatch,”
which runs downloadable sports and fitness apps and connects to a smartphone. Pebble: EPaper Watch for iPhone and Android, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com
/projects/597507018/pebble-e-paper-watch-for-iphone-and-android [http://perma.cc/UY2B
-HTBT]. The watch retailed at $150 but the campaign allowed backers to pre-order the
watch for just $99. Id. The company sought $100,000, acquired 68,929 backers, and raised
$10,266,845. Id.
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crowdfunding allows entrepreneurs to solicit contributions in
exchange for future goods, experiences, or even a simple thank you.66
Last, the newest form of crowdfunding, known as “equity
crowdfunding,” allows individuals to invest in nonpublicly traded
companies in exchange for equity securities.67 The SEC currently
permits limited equity crowdfunding but only for accredited
investors68 and a small number of unaccredited but sophisticated
investors to participate in crowdfunded offerings.69 Prior to the
passage of the federal JOBS Act,70 equity financing was not
practically available to small businesses due to burdensome
registration and compliance costs71 and restrictive securities laws.72
But following passage of the federal JOBS Act, equity crowdfunding
has the potential to be a game changer for startups and small
businesses.
III. THE FEDERAL JOBS ACT INTRODUCES EQUITY
CROWDFUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES
President Obama signed the federal JOBS Act on April 5, 2012,73
to encourage entrepreneurship, increase small businesses’ access to
capital, “ease the overwhelming regulations” that hinder small

66. See Chance Barnett, Crowdfunding Sites in 2014, FORBES (Aug. 29, 2014, 6:11 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2014/08/29/crowdfunding-sites-in-2014/
[http://perma.cc/PB6G-C9R6 (staff-uploaded archive)].
67. What Is Equity Crowdfunding?, SYNDICATE ROOM, https://www.syndicateroom
.com/investors/what-is-equity-crowdfunding.aspx [http://perma.cc/S9QY-AVNY].
68. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201(a)(1), 126 Stat. 306, 313 (2012) (directing
the SEC to revise its rules in section 230.506 of title 17 of the Code of Federal Regulations
to permit solicitation of securities offerings so long as all purchasers are accredited
investors). Accredited investors are generally persons or entities with high levels of
financial sophistication or net worth, see 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2015), including any
individual or married couple who has net worth of $1 million or greater (excluding the
investor’s primary residence), or an individual that made $200,000 alone, or $300,000 with
a spouse, in each of the previous two years. Id. § 230.501(a)(5)–(6).
69. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.508(b)(2) (permitting only thirty-five unaccredited investors
but requiring that they or a representative be sufficiently sophisticated to evaluate the
“merits and risks of the prospective investment”).
70. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
71. See, e.g., William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The
Irony of “Going Private”, 55 EMORY L.J. 141, 151 (2006) (“Compliance costs required by
the securities laws and by SOX have a large element of fixed costs that do not vary
proportionately with firm size.”).
72. See Ross S. Weinstein, Note, Crowdfunding in the U.S. and Abroad: What To
Expect When You’re Expecting, 46 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 427, 428 (2013).
73. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306.
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businesses,74 and promote economic growth.75 The JOBS Act
accomplishes these goals by amending the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 in several ways.76 Most importantly for this Comment, Title III
of the JOBS Act, or the “Capital Raising Online While Deterring
Fraud
and
Unethical
Non-Disclosure
Act
of
2012,”
(“CROWDFUND Act”) permits unaccredited investors to
participate in online securities offerings.77 The following section
highlights several key provisions of Title III, which still require SEC
rulemaking for full implementation.
A. Overview of the Federal JOBS Act’s Crowdfunding Exemption
The SEC has yet to implement rules regarding several key
provisions of Title III. Specifically, these provisions include: (1)
aggregate offering limits and the accompanying disclosures triggered
by certain offering limits; (2) aggregate annual limits on individual
investor contributions; (3) pre- and post-offering disclosure
requirements; (4) the “all-or-nothing” provision on equity
crowdfunding issuers’ target offering amounts and the Act’s one-year
prohibition of crowdfunded securities; and (5) rules governing
intermediaries that feature issuers of crowdfunded securities. Each is
discussed in more detail below.
1. Aggregate Fundraising Limits and Accompanying Disclosures
Title III of the JOBS Act amends the Securities Act of 1933 to
allow businesses, or securities “issuers,” to raise up to $1,000,000 in
any twelve-month period.78 Issuers seeking $100,000 or less must
74. 157 CONG. REC. H9801 (2011) (daily ed. Dec. 16, 2011) (statement of Rep. Dold).
75. Congress acknowledged that “the future success of our economy rests in the hands
of small, private business[.]” 158 CONG. REC. H1222 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2012) (statement of
Rep. Sessions). Providing such small businesses with access to the capital they need will
create “an economic environment that promotes growth and generates more revenue for
the Federal government.” Id.
76. These amendments include (1) reducing the financial reporting obligations of
smaller companies, see JOBS Act § 102, 126 Stat. at 308–10 (codified in various sections
of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–aa, 78a–pp); (2) permitting general solicitation and advertising for
certain securities offerings, see § 201, 126 Stat. at 313–15 (to be codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 77d); (3) providing for a potential exemption for private offerings under $50
million, see § 401, 126 Stat. at 323–25 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(b), 77d,
77r(b)(4)); and (4) relaxing the number of equity holders permitted before SEC
registration is required. See §§ 501, 502, 602, 126 Stat. at 325–27 (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78l(g), 78o(d)).
77. See § 302(a)(6)(B), 126 Stat. at 315 (to be codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77d)
(permitting sale to any investor, though with limits on the amount to be invested by any
individual investor).
78. § 302(a)(6)(A), 126 Stat. at 315.
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provide filed tax returns for the previous calendar year in addition to
financial statements certified by the “principal executive officer.”79
Issuers seeking between $100,001 and $500,000 must provide financial
statements reviewed by an independent public accountant.80 If
seeking to raise more than $500,000, an issuer must provide audited
financial statements.81
2. Aggregate Annual Limits on Individual Investor Contributions
The FEDERAL JOBS Act limits the aggregate contributions of
unaccredited investors. “Accredited investors” include financial
institutions, high-net-worth individuals, sophisticated investors, and
the directors of an issuer.82 The term “unaccredited investors,”
therefore, includes everyone else, such as nonwealthy,
unsophisticated, and individual retail investors.83 An individual
investor with annual income or net worth less than $100,000 can
contribute up to $2,000 or 5% of his or her annual income or net
worth, whichever is greater.84 If the investor’s annual income or net
worth is $100,000 or more, the investor’s aggregate investment is
limited to 10% of the investor’s annual income or net worth, up to a
maximum contribution of $100,000.85 The Federal JOBS Act does not
place a cap on the contributions of accredited investors.86
3. Pre-Offering and Post-Offering Disclosure Requirements
Issuers must file with the SEC and provide investors with
extensive pre-offering disclosures that include: (1) background
information regarding the issuer, its officers, directors, and each
person holding more than twenty percent of the issuer’s shares; (2)
information regarding the issuer’s ownership and capital structure; (3)
information regarding the issuer’s business plan; (4) the issuer’s target
offering amount, a deadline to reach the target, and the intended use
of the proceeds; (5) the price of the securities or a method for
calculating the price; (6) a description of the issuer’s financial
condition and other recent offerings; (7) regular updates regarding
the target offering amount and requisite deadline; and (8) requisite

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(1)(D)(i) (2013).
§ 77d-1(b)(1)(D)(ii).
§ 77d-1(b)(1)(D)(iii).
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.215 (2012).
See id.
15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(i) (2012).
§ 77d(a)(6)(B)(ii).
See id.
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information under future SEC rules, once they are issued.87 The issuer
must also provide post-offering annual operational and financial
reports subject to future SEC rule.88
4. Target Offering Limits and Resale Restrictions
Offering proceeds will be released to the issuer once its target
offering amount is reached, subject to additional SEC rulemaking.89
Specifically, the SEC must make rules determining to what extent
investors may cancel their commitments to invest.90 Investors cannot
transfer or resell their crowdfunded securities for one year after the
offering, subject to limited exceptions.91
5. Rules Governing Intermediaries
Offerings will be made through intermediaries who will register
with the SEC either as funding portals or broker-dealers.92
Intermediaries must conduct background checks on issuers.93 The
SEC will prescribe rules regarding additional disclosures, investor
education materials and questions to be provided by intermediaries,
as well as other matters the SEC may decide to require.94
Although Congress provided a guiding framework by enacting
these provisions, the SEC must also promulgate rules that fill in the
gaps left open by Congress, as noted above. The next section explains
the SEC’s delay in doing so, and discusses how states have acted to fill
that void.

87. § 77d-1(b).
88. § 77d-1(b)(4).
89. § 77d-1(a)(7).
90. Id.
91. § 77d-1(e) (permitting transfer of such securities only back to the issuer, to an
accredited investor, to a family member, or as part of a registered offering).
92. § 77d-1(a)(1).
93. § 77d-1(a)(5).
94. See § 77d-1(a)(3), (a)(4)(C)(iii). Under its proposed rules, the SEC would require
intermediaries to “positively affirm” that investors review financial education materials
that meet SEC standards, once established. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,471
(Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, and 249). At the
same time, the SEC expressed the view that intermediaries should be empowered to
design their own compliance programs, considering the intermediary’s business model,
types of offerings, and “other relevant considerations.” Id. Thus, the SEC’s proposal
empowers intermediaries to decide what education materials to provide, reasoning that
“an intermediary’s familiarity with its business and likely investor base would make it best
able to determine that format in which to present the [educational materials].” Id.
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Lack of SEC Rules For JOBS Act Implementation

While Congress has created the general framework for equity
crowdfunding, several provisions in the JOBS Act still require SEC
rulemaking for full implementation.95 Although Congress directed the
SEC to issue rules to implement Title III of the JOBS Act within 270
days of enactment,96 the January 5, 2013, deadline has long since
passed. In the vacuum left by SEC inaction, states have taken the
initiative by passing their own crowdfunding exemptions under
section 3(a)(11) of the Securities Act of 1933, which exempts
completely intrastate crowdfunding transactions from SEC
regulation.97 As of this writing, fourteen states have passed intrastate
crowdfunding
exemptions,
including
Kansas,98
Georgia,99
100
101
102
103
104
Wisconsin, Michigan, Alabama, Maine, Indiana, Idaho,105
Colorado,106 Maryland,107 Tennessee,108 Washington,109 Texas,110 and
Oregon.111 Unfortunately, while North Carolina was one of the first
95. See supra Section III.A.
96. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 302(b), 304(a)(2), 126 Stat. 306, 315–22
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a, 77c).
97. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2012) (exempting
intrastate offerings from SEC registration so long as the issuer is a business organized in
the state where its securities are issued and all investors reside in that state).
98. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 81-5-21 (2015).
99. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 590-4-2.08 (West, Westlaw through July 31, 2015).
100. WIS. STAT. §§ 551.202(26), 551.205 (2015).
101. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 451.2202a (West, Westlaw through 2015 Mich. Pub.
Acts 130).
102. ALA. CODE § 8-6-11 (West, Westlaw through Act 2015-520).
103. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 16304(6-A)(D) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 377 of
the 2015 1st Reg. Sess.).
104. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-19-2-2(27) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.).
105. Idaho takes an approach unique from the traditional crowdfunding exemptions
seen in other states. IDAHO CODE § 30-14-203 (LEXIS through 2015 Reg. and 1st Extra.
Sess.). The Director of the Department of Finance of Idaho reviews, approves, and issues
orders on a case-by-case basis. Id. For an example of one of these orders, see Treasure
Valley Angel Fund, LLC, No. 2012-7-02 (Idaho Dep’t of Finance Jan. 20, 2012), http://www
.finance.idaho.gov/securities/Actions/Administrative/2012/2012-7-02.pdf
[http://perma.cc
/3YNV-4BZJ].
106. COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51-308 (LEXIS through 1st Reg. Sess. of the 70th Gen.
Assemb.).
107. Maryland’s law only permits debt crowdfunding. MD. CODE. ANN., CORPS. &
ASS’NS § 11-601 (LEXIS through ch. 475 of the 2015 Legis. Sess.)
108. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1-103(b)(9)(C) (2012).
109. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 21.20.310, .320, .325 (West, Westlaw through 2015
Reg. Sess. & 1st, 2d & 3d Spec. Sess.).
110. 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 139.25 (West, Westlaw through 40 Tex. Reg. No. 5104,
dated Sept. 18, 2015).
111. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 59.035(15) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 848 of the 2015
Reg. Sess.).
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states to draft an intrastate equity crowdfunding exemption, the bill’s
failure in the state legislature has kept North Carolina off that list.112
IV. THE NORTH CAROLINA JOBS ACT
The North Carolina Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, or
House Bill 680 (“H.B. 680”), was intended to a less restrictive version
of the Federal JOBS Act. Compared with the federal exemption,
H.B. 680 included higher offering limits, fixed (instead of variable)
annual individual unaccredited investment limits, and less rigorous
disclosure requirements.
Section IV.A of this Comment addresses H.B. 680’s approach to
each of the Federal JOBS Act provisions noted above. Section IV.B
explains the reasons for and immediate effects of the bill’s failure.
A. North Carolina House Bill 680’s Approach to Intrastate
Crowdfunding
House Bill 680’s approach to crowdfunding included (1)
aggregate offering limits and accompanying disclosures triggered by
offering limits; (2) aggregate annual limits on individual investor
contributions; (3) issuer pre- and post-offering disclosure
requirements; (4) target offering limits and the “all-or-nothing”
provision; (5) the nine-month resale restriction on crowdfunded
securities; and (6) limited rules governing intermediaries. Each of
these provisions is discussed below.
1. Aggregate Fundraising Limits and Accompanying Disclosures
The North Carolina JOBS Act would have permitted issuers to
raise up to $1,000,000 within any twelve-month period without
producing audited financial statements.113 In contrast, the federal
exemption requires audited financials from issuers that seek to raise
$500,000 or more114 and financial statements reviewed by an
independent public accountant for those seeking financing greater
than $100,000.115 Moreover, H.B. 680 provided issuers with an
additional option not seen in the federal exemption—to raise up to
$2,000,000 with audited financial statements.116

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See supra note 10.
H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(3)(a).
15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(1)(D)(iii) (2013).
§ 77d-1(b)(1)(D)(ii).
H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(3)(b).
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2. Aggregate Annual Limits on Individual Investor Contributions
Under H.B. 680, unaccredited investors’117 aggregate
contributions would have been limited to $2,000 per issuer, per
year.118 Accredited investors would not have been subject to any
aggregate investment cap.119 By contrast, the federal exemption
provides for a variable cap based on unaccredited investors’ annual
income or net worth,120 rather than the fixed investment cap in H.B.
680 that would have applied to all unaccredited investors, regardless
of their income or net worth.121
3. Pre-Offering and Post-Offering Disclosure Requirements
Although pre- and post-offering disclosure requirements under
the federal exemption remain subject to SEC rulemaking,122 H.B. 680
closely mirrored the requirements prescribed in the federal
crowdfunding exemption. Under H.B. 680, issuers would have been
required to produce a set of disclosures at least ten days prior to their
securities offerings.123 Required disclosures included: (1) background
information about the underwriter, the company, its executive
officers, and any shareholders with at least ten percent ownership in
the company’s securities; (2) the company’s business plan; (3) the
issuer’s target offering amount, a deadline to reach that target, and a
statement describing the intended use of the offering proceeds; (4)
information regarding the issuer’s capital structure; (5) information
regarding the terms and potential modifications to securities, the
differences among classes of securities, and the total percentage
ownership of the company that the offered securities represent; (6) a
discussion of significant factors that make a particular offering risky;
(7) a description of any litigation or legal proceedings involving the
company or its management; and (8) the websites that would be used
in connection with the offering.124
House Bill 680 would have required issuers to display on the
cover page of their disclosure documents a legend that alerted
investors awareness to the risks associated with crowdfunded

117. H.B. 680 borrows the SEC’s definition of “accredited investor.” Compare id. sec.
2, § 78A-17.1(a)(4), with 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2012) (defining “accredited investor”).
118. H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(4).
119. Id.
120. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(i)–(ii) (2012).
121. H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(4).
122. See supra Section III.A.3.
123. H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(5).
124. Id. sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(5)(b).
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securities.125 Additionally, the bill would have required investors to
certify in writing that they understood the financial risks of investing
in crowdfunded securities.126 Subsequent to the offering, H.B. 680
would have required issuers to provide to investors quarterly financial
and operational reports.127
4. Target Offering Limits and Resale Restrictions
Under H.B. 680, offering proceeds would have been collected
and deposited in escrow in a North Carolina bank.128 The proceeds
would have been released to the issuer only once the aggregate
capital raised from all investors met the issuer’s offering target.129
Under the “all-or-nothing” rule, similar to that provided in the
federal exemption,130 if the issuer failed to reach its offering target by
the deadline stated in the pre-offering disclosures, investors would
have been free to cancel their commitments.131 Post-offering, H.B. 680
would have temporarily prohibited investors from reselling or
transferring securities, subject to limited exceptions.132
5. Rules Governing Intermediaries
Additionally, under H.B. 680, intermediaries would have been
required to obtain evidence from an issuer that the issuer was
incorporated and “authorized to do business” in North Carolina.133
Intermediaries would also have been prohibited from certain
activities that may create conflicts of interest.134 Specifically,
intermediaries would have been prohibited from offering investment
advice or recommendations, advertising particular securities,
compensating or furnishing commissions based on sales of certain
securities on the intermediary’s website, and holding, investing, or
handling investors’ funds or securities.135 The federal exemption

125. Id. sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(7) (including warnings about liquidity risk, the potential
inaccuracy of disclosure documents, and the investor’s burden to examine the issuer and
terms of the offering).
126. Id. sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(8).
127. Id. sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(c).
128. Id. sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(5)(c).
129. Id.
130. See supra Section III.A.4.
131. H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(5)(c).
132. Id. sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(7).
133. Id. sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(9)(a).
134. Id. sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(11)-(12).
135. Id.
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provides similar requirements, though the SEC may impose
additional requirements via rulemaking.136
B.

“We Can Do Better. Let’s Kill This Thing and Do Better.”137

House Bill 680 passed the North Carolina House of
Representatives with near unanimous support.138 The bill was then
approved by the senate commerce committee,139 before it stalled as
part of a complicated legislative power play between the state house,
senate, and Governor McCrory.140 Rather than passing the
crowdfunding exception on its own, the senate attached the language
of H.B. 680 to a bill that would have enacted several controversial
economic development incentives and budget initiatives that were
deeply unpopular in the house, but supported by the governor.141 In a
“legislative insurrection” against the senate, governor, and house
leadership, H.B. 1224 was narrowly defeated, taking the popular
crowdfunding exemption with it.142 Thus, if the votes on H.B. 680
were at all predictive, the crowdfunding exemption was politically
popular and would have easily passed had it not been embroiled in
the showdown between the house, senate, and governor.143 However,
there may still be room for improvement. In the wake of the
crowdfunding exemption’s defeat, one state legislator simply said:
“We can do better. Let’s kill this thing and do better.”144
The state suffered tangible consequences as a result of the bill’s
failure, as North Carolina’s small businesses and startups were denied

136. 15 U.S.C. § 78c (2013).
137. Smith, supra note 11.
138. See supra note 10.
139. See, e.g., Samantha Hurst, North Carolina’s Senate Commerce Committee
Approves Equity Crowdfunding Bill, CROWDFUND INSIDER (July 18, 2014, 7:23 AM),
http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2014/07/44473-north-carolinas-senate-approves-equitycrowdfunding-bill/ [http://perma.cc/V3XH-U25T]; David Rani, Crowdfunding Bill Endorsed
by Senate Committee, NEWS & OBSERVER (July 16, 2014), http://www.newsobserver.com
/news/business/article10026410.html [http://perma.cc/8KYX-ZZHB].
140. Laura Leslie, House Defeats Senate Gambit on TAs, Incentives, WRAL (Aug. 20,
2014), http://www.wral.com/house-defeats-senate-gambit-on-tas-incentives/13906612/
[http://perma.cc/398U-72L8].
141. H.B. 1224, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013); Mark Binker, Senate Wants
To Tie Teaching Assistant Money to Economic Development Bill, WRAL (Aug. 14, 2014),
http://www.wral.com/senate-wants-to-tie-teaching-assistant-money-to-economicdevelopment-bill/13894547/ [http://perma.cc/JA4R-ZJTK].
142. Leslie, supra note 140.
143. Intrastate Crowdfunding Is Officially Dead in North Carolina—For Now, supra
note 10.
144. Smith, supra note 11.
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the tremendous potential benefits of equity crowdfunding.145 Some
small businesses that were counting on crowdfunding immediately
relocated to new states where crowdfunding exemptions had already
passed.146 Likewise, states that already have crowdfunding exemptions
have produced several notable business successes.147
V. THE CASE FOR EQUITY CROWDFUNDING IN NORTH CAROLINA
The General Assembly should bring equity crowdfunding to
North Carolina under a new and improved crowdfunding exemption.
North Carolina forgoes tremendous benefits associated with equity
crowdfunding while also suffering from a competitive disadvantage
compared to other states where exemptions have been passed.
Allowing North Carolinian entrepreneurs to draw on equity
crowdfunding can help grow the state’s economy by encouraging
entrepreneurship—thus improving on already innovative ideas;
entrepreneurs’ access to the capital they desperately need; and
increasing investor opportunities, returns, and diversification.
At the same time, there are also concerns associated with equity
crowdfunding that have challenged its development. Those concerns
include the high risks associated with startups, the high rate of small
business failure, and potential abuse by fraudsters. On balance, the
benefits of equity crowdfunding outweigh the concerns, which
145. See, e.g., Lauren K. Ohnesorge, Groundfloor Leaves Raleigh for Atlanta, Cites
“Progressive Stance”, TRIANGLE BUS. J. (Aug. 19, 2014, 11:21 AM), http://www.bizjournals
.com/triangle/news/2014/08/19/groundfloor-leaves-raleigh-for-atlanta-cites.html [http://perma
.cc/TVZ2-QHA6 (staff-uploaded archive)]; see also Ruth Simon & Angus Loten,
‘CrowdFunding’ Gets a State-Level Test Run, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 4, 2013, 7:46 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303722104579237862928397316 [http://perma
.cc/92P8-ZTGH (staff-uploaded archive)] (reporting on the first small companies to take
advantage of Georgia’s crowdfunding exemption).
146. For example, Groundfloor, a Raleigh-based real estate investment startup, moved
to Atlanta, Georgia, where equity crowdfunding was already legal. Ohnesorge, supra note
145. Notably, Groundfloor explained that the primary reason for the move was that
Georgia was “arguably the most forward-thinking state on issues related to
crowdfunding[.]” Id.
147. Bohemian Guitars, which sells oilcan guitars starting at $250, used the Georgia
exemption to raise $126,000, enough to manufacture 1,000 guitars. See Simon & Loten,
supra note 145. More recently, Tecumseh Brewing used Michigan’s intrastate exemption
to raise $175,000. Stateside Staff, Tecumseh Brewing Is MILE’s First Crowdfunding
Success, MICH. RADIO (May 15, 2014), http://michiganradio.org/post/tecumseh-brewingcompany-miles-first-crowdfunding-success [http://perma.cc/68HJ-5779]. Construction and
rehabilitation financing have “had some success raising funds for real-estate projects,
especially . . . in deals where a bank loan would be difficult or not well-suited to the deal.”
Nicole Fallon, Crowdfunding Goes Mainstream: Trends and Tips for 2015, BUS. NEWS
DAILY (Nov. 25, 2014, 10:06 AM), http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/7506-crowdfundingtrends-tips.html [http://perma.cc/P4BL-SDZX].
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appropriate legislation can mitigate. Ultimately, states are best
positioned to regulate crowdfunding by legislating to capture its
benefits and to mitigate its risks.
A. Benefits of Equity Crowdfunding
Currently, there are at least two barriers to entrepreneurs’ access
to business capital. First, entrepreneurs cannot access investor funds if
they cannot connect with investors.148 This barrier is often the cause
of the geographic concentration of business capital in certain areas,
like Silicon Valley.149 Notably, the majority of startup capital is raised
within fifty miles of the startup firm’s location.150 The Internet can
help ameliorate this disconnect. Online equity crowdfunding portals
allow investors to remotely search, identify, and evaluate investment
opportunities.151 The Internet’s ability to connect financiers and
entrepreneurs is already evinced by other varieties of
crowdfunding.152
Second, private small business investment is generally limited to
wealthy, “sophisticated” individuals, or firms that specialize in startup
firm investments.153 However, crowdfunding expands the investor
base by providing entrepreneurs a fresh, untapped, and abundant
source of capital.154 Equity crowdfunding will allow “unaccredited”
investors155—everyday people—to begin to invest in small businesses
and startup companies.156 Thus, unlike companies funded by angel
investors or venture capital, projects funded by equity crowdfunding
reach their target offering goals by soliciting small contributions from
a large number of investors.157 Furthermore, crowdfunding empowers
people to wed their passions and interests to a financial return, which
already takes place with existing forms of crowdfunding.158 Investors

148. See supra notes 34–47 and accompanying text.
149. Bradford, supra note 48, at 101; see also Stearns & Mizruchi, supra note 41, at 291.
150. See Thomas E. Vass, North Carolina’s New Nexus of Innovation: Where Local
Capital in N.C. Cities Funds Local Investment Opportunities in Technology
Commercialization, BESTTHINKING, http://www.bestthinking.com/articles/economics/political
_economy/north-carolina-s-new-nexus-of-innovation-where-local-capital-in-n-c-cities-fundslocal-investment-opportunities-in-technology-commercialization
[http://perma.cc/VP8D5UWK].
151. See supra notes 67–72 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 60–72 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 35–47 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text.
155. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.215 (2012) (defining “accredited investor”).
156. See supra Section III.A.1.
157. See supra notes 67–72 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 60–66 and accompanying text.
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uninterested in traditional purposes for investing may find such an
option particularly attractive.159
While equity crowdfunding expands the investor base, it also
expands the entrepreneurial base. Lack of access to capital poses a
substantial obstacle to small business startups.160 After investing the
time and effort necessary to bring its ideas to fruition, a would-be
startup faces the bona fide risk that a capital shortfall could stonewall
its project.161 Facing that risk leaves many would-be entrepreneurs
with cold feet.162 Equity crowdfunding may encourage
entrepreneurship and increase innovation by reducing capital risks.163
Furthermore, crowdfunding portals will facilitate open
communication among investors, potential customers, and
entrepreneurs, allowing these three groups to align their interests.164
Investors can air their concerns by providing specific
recommendations to issuers. Issuers will benefit from customer and
investor feedback before spending substantial sums on production,
allowing issuers to perfect their products and proactively respond to
159. See, e.g., Why Invest, SEC, http://investor.gov/introduction-markets/why-invest
#.VJbmmsAAA [http://perma.cc/PHJ9-WDKR] (explaining that people generally invest to
attain financial security or grow their wealth).
160. See supra Part I.
161. See, e.g., Quitting My Corporate Job for My Dream Startup Ruined My Life,
BANKS.COM (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.banks.com/articles/quitting-my-corporate-job-mydream-startup-ruined-my-life [http://perma.cc/LGN2-XRXK] (“I was running out of funds
for the entire project at a much quicker rate than I had predicted. There were so many
unexpected costs in the startup process that I hadn’t accounted for being new to the realm
of starting my own business.”); Taylor Sloper, Too Scared To Leave Your 9-to-5? Code
Fellows’ Brent Turner Debunks Silly Startup Myths, GEEKWIRE (Oct. 22, 2013, 4:37 PM),
http://www.geekwire.com/2013/codefellows-ceo-brent-turner/ [http://perma.cc/WBW8-8WH2]
(“There’s no question that joining or founding a startup involves more risk financially than
taking a secure corporate job.”).
162. See ALAN S. GUTTERMAN, BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS SOLUTIONS § 313:4 n.4,
Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2015) (noting that the “climate of entrepreneurship”
includes “perceptions of prospective entrepreneurs regarding the availability of
opportunities . . . their ability to start businesses and . . . the availability of support from
others”); Mark Williams, Fear of Failure Blamed for Central Ohio’s Lack of Business
Startups, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Sept. 18, 2013, 1:37 AM), http://www.dispatch.com
/content/stories/business/2014/09/18/fear-is-one-reason-area-hasnt-grown-businesses.html
[http://perma.cc/T3AF-R48M] (attributing fear of failure and fundraising struggles to
startup hesitancy).
163. See, e.g., NADINE SCHOLZ, THE RELEVANCE OF CROWDFUNDING: THE IMPACT
ON THE INNOVATION PROCESS OF SMALL ENTREPRENEURIAL FIRMS 61 (2015)
(“Crowdfunding reduces this risk because it ‘is helpful in validating the market demand
and idea concept; a normal new venture does not have this possibility to show this
demand.’ ” (internal ellipses omitted)).
164. Intermediaries are required by the SEC’s proposal to provide communication
channels on their funding portals. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,557 (Nov. 5,
2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, and 249).
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customer needs before they enter the market.165 Accordingly,
crowdfunding allows “[n]ew ideas [to] be free market tested earlier in
their development cycle and discarded or funded at a faster rate.”166
Thanks to the unique risks associated with small startup
companies, crowdfunded securities should provide higher risk
premiums, potentially resulting in higher returns to investors.167
Before crowdfunding was possible, investments in small or startup
companies were generally available only to wealthy individuals and
institutional investors.168 New opportunities provided by
crowdfunding will allow unsophisticated investors to better diversify
their investment portfolios.169
B.

Concerns Associated with Equity Crowdfunding

There are also several concerns associated with permitting small
businesses and startups to solicit equity capital from nontraditional
and “unsophisticated” investors.170 The preceding discussion
illustrates one of the primary drawbacks to crowdfunded securities—
the risk of loss, which is “inherent in small business startups.”171
However, the only way to completely eliminate the risk would be to
“bar small business financing altogether.”172 Alternatively, the
aggregate individual investment limits found in the federal and state
165. See Howard Greenstein, Tool To Predict Tech Startup Success, INC. (Aug. 29, 2011),
http://www.inc.com/howard-greenstein/tool-to-predict-tech-startup-success.html [http://perma
.cc/DDT7-NH5L (dark archive)] (discussing a recent study that found many startups failed
because they focused more on their product than their potential customers and would
benefit from incorporating customer feedback in the design of product prototypes).
166. Howard Leonhardt, The Enormous Implications of Crowdfunding, CROWDFUNDBEAT,
http://crowdfundbeat.com/2014/10/13/the-enormous-implications-of-crowdfunding/
[http://perma.cc/9MUP-YGHD].
167. A security’s risk premium “is a form of compensation for investors who tolerate
the extra risk—compared to that of a risk-free asset—in a given investment.” Risk
Premium Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/riskpremium
.asp [http://perma.cc/TW77-AXRX].
168. See supra notes 34–46, 68 and accompanying text.
169. Ryan Caldbeck, How Crowdfunding Can Boost Your Investment Diversity,
FORBES (Dec. 19, 2013, 12:05 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryancaldbeck/2013/12/19
/how-crowdfunding-can-boost-your-investment-diversit/ [http://perma.cc/37CE-MFXG].
170. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,517, 66,519 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, and 249) (referring to the risks faced by
“unsophisticated investors”); Alan R. Palmiter, Pricing Disclosure: Crowdfunding’s Curious
Conundrum, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 373, 374 (2012) (noting the SEC’s
“view that there is no way unsophisticated investors can apply a DCF/CAPM analysis . . . .”);
Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for
Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 461 (2003) (suggesting disclosures may be
tailored to “unsophisticated” investors).
171. Bradford, supra note 48, at 99; see supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.
172. Bradford, supra note 48, at 99.
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JOBS acts strike a balance by making losses to any single investor
“relatively small and bearable.”173 Moreover, the risks inherent in
equity crowdfunding are comparable to other types of crowdfunding,
to which “the public is already contributing billions of dollars.”174 And
those types of crowdfunding do not necessarily offer returns to
investors to compensate for risk.175
Equity crowdfunding may not offer issuers the support and
business expertise provided by VC funds and angel investors.176
However, the “crowd,” which includes investors, and perhaps even
potential customers and experts, will supply additional, qualitative
insight to issuers through communication portals on intermediaries’
websites.177 Crowdfunding portals may also choose to employ their
own experts to assist issuers, similar to crowdfunding offerings seen
elsewhere.178
Like any arrangement where people provide funds to an
unfamiliar person, crowdfunding opens the door to fraud. Fraudulent
issuers may raise money to pay themselves, family, or friends out of
investors’ pockets under the guise of a legitimate business.179 Issuers
may attempt to dupe “unsophisticated” investors by promising
“unrealistic returns on investment.”180 The reduced transparency
inherent in crowdfunding increases the likelihood of fraud, where
investors “are likely to be strangers to the company, and, as such,
would have no information about the company except that provided
by the company or website where the securities are offered for
sale.”181 These concerns can be mitigated by, among other things,
providing for more useful, comprehensible, standardized disclosures
supplemented with investor education requirements, and by
incentivizing intermediaries to vigorously screen issuers. These
proposals will be discussed in greater detail in Part VI.
173. Id.
174. Id.; see also supra Part II.
175. See supra notes 60–66 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 38–44 and accompanying text.
177. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 427–30.
178. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 192–97.
179. Lyndon M. Tretter, Crowdfunding: Small-Business Incubator or Securities Fraud
Accelerator?, 18 WESTLAW J. SEC. LITIG. & REG., Aug. 21, 2012, at *1, *1, 18 No. 8
WJSLR; see also Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks
and the Securities Laws—Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned on
Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1767 (2012) (explaining that “fraudsters
have for nearly a century found ways to adapt their schemes to new technologies” using
methods such as boiler-room tactics, pump-and-dump operations, and Ponzi schemes).
180. Tretter, supra note 179, at *2; see also Hazen, supra note 179, at 1766–67 & n.192.
181. Hazen, supra note 179, at 1766.
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Given that online equity crowdfunding is brand new, its practical
implications are unclear. Variations of equity crowdfunding platforms
exist outside the United States, but most face the same uncertainty
that seems to plague the industry in general.182 The United
Kingdom,183 Germany,184 Italy,185 and France,186 among other
countries, have already established their own variations of
crowdfunding, but often with informal or unclear guidance and
shoddy enforcement.187 Several questions remain unanswered. Will
equity crowdfunding effectively improve access to business capital?
Which regulatory schemes are effective? Is fraud pervasive, and if so,
what regulatory measures are available to effectively combat fraud?
For over ten years, companies have been able to offer liquid
equity securities under established securities laws in Australia.188 The
Australian Small Scale Offering Board (“ASSOB”) is the best, and

182. See generally Weinstein, supra note 72, at 437–49 (2013) (describing variations on
crowdfunding outside the United States and the challenges faced by investors, issuers,
intermediaries, and regulators).
183. The United Kingdom simply applies current securities regulations to the equity
crowdfunding industry, without prescribing additional rules exclusive to equity
crowdfunding. See Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, c. 8, §§ 85(1), 86(1)(b) (U.K.)
(exempting from registration those securities offered to fewer than 150 persons). The U.K.
crowdfunding space currently consists of two funding portals. Weinstein, supra note 72, at
437. To participate, investors are required to undergo a rigorous certification process. Id.
at 439.
184. Crowdfunding in Germany essentially operates similarly as it does throughout
Europe—without any real regulatory “approval or disapproval.” Weinstein, supra note 72,
at 447. For example, crowdfunding in Germany operated on an assumption that offerings
were limited to €100,000 until the crowdfunding platform Seedmatch challenged this limit
in 2012. Id. German regulators acquiesced, and now crowdfunding campaigns may exceed
the limit. Id. Subsequently, German authorities published guidance, but it only noted
existing regulations that “might restrict or prohibit crowdfunding activity.” Id. (citing Jörg
Begner, Crowdfunding and Supervisory Laws, BAFIN, at 9 (3d Q. 2012) http://www.bafin
.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Mitteilungsblatt/Quarterly/bq1203.pdf?blob=publicationFile
[http://perma.cc/453V-5J6J].
185. Crowdfunding was legalized in Italy, but with minimal guidance. See Weinstein,
supra note 72, at 443–44. Equity crowdfunding is limited to small businesses. See id.
Companies that have existed for longer than forty-eight months or with revenues over
€5 million by the second year are ineligible for crowdfunding. See id. at 444.
186. France has a unique system called “CIGALES,” which operates a federation of
democratically governed clubs that pool their money to invest in “ethically operated small
businesses or businesses with particular social or cultural goals.” Id. at 444–45. The clubs
operate altruistically and do not require a return on their investments. Id.
187. For example, one U.K. funding portal has been presenting equity opportunities to
investors without regulatory approval and is yet to be stopped. See id. at 441. Likewise,
while German law provides for low investment caps, Seedmatch raised over €100,000 in
violation of an unofficial and previously assumed limitation See id. at 447.
188. See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ch 6D s 708 (Austl.).
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perhaps only established equity crowdfunding platform to date.189
ASSOB functions like a traditional stock market, and it is primarily
self-regulated by the funding portals that operate within it.190
Individual stock offerings are limited to “[twenty] unaccredited
investors per year,” but offerings are unlimited as to “accredited and
overseas investors.”191
ASSOB illustrates that equity crowdfunding can be successful
and not as risky as some commentators suggest.192 One study noted
that as of April 21, 2014, more than eighty percent of firms financed
through ASSOB were still functioning.193 There have been no
reported incidents of fraud.194 Moreover, ASSOB is uniquely
supportive of its issuers. ASSOB provides templates and appoints
trained sponsors to assist issuers in the crowdfunding process.195
ASSOB intermediaries often employ sophisticated finance and
investment professionals that meticulously screen and select highercapability firms before listing firms on their portals.196 Additionally,
the ASSOB lobby engages regulators “to build an environment that
allows for capital-raising in a controlled yet not onerous
environment.”197
However, in ASSOB, the average contribution per investor is
$30,000.198Although this number could be misleading—because highend contributions tend to greatly exceed the mean—it is far greater

189. See AUSTL. SMALL SCALE OFFERING BOARD, http://assob.com.au/ [http://perma
.cc/SS8T-W6XY] (“ASSOB matches entrepreneurs, job creators and business pioneers
seeking growth capital with investors desirous of investing in high growth opportunities.”).
190. Crowd Funding—Lessons Learned in 8 Years of Equity Crowd Funding, IPLEDGE
(Jan. 28, 2014), https://www.ipledg.com/crowd-funding-lessons-learned-in-8-years-of-equitycrowd-funding/ [http://perma.cc/VR6N-7D6L].
191. See id.
192. See, e.g., Hazen, supra note 179, at 1767 (suggesting fraud is a serious concern
associated with crowdfunding); Palmiter, supra note 170, at 415 (identifying barriers to
pricing disclosure under a crowdfunding exemption); Benjamin P. Siegel, Title III of the
Jobs Act: Using Unsophisticated Wealth To Crowdfund Small Business Capital or
Fraudsters’ Bank Accounts?, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 777, 796–99 (2013) (suggesting that lack
of transparency, fraud, and potential investor losses under a crowdfunding exemption pose
risks).
193. Richard Swart, The Truth About Crowd Selection and Crowdfunding Success,
CROWDFUND INSIDER (Apr. 21, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2014
/04/36354-truth-crowd-selection-crowdfunding-success/ [http://perma.cc/9UDT-DWG2].
194. Id.
195. Crowd Funding—Lessons Learned in 8 Years of Equity Crowd Funding, supra
note 190.
196. See Swart, supra note 193.
197. Crowd Funding—Lessons Learned in 8 Years of Equity Crowd Funding, supra
note 190.
198. Id.
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than the ideal investment sizes envisioned by advocates for
crowdfunding in the United States.199 Furthermore, because only
twenty unaccredited investors may participate in any individual
offering,200 ASSOB does not necessarily lend itself to the entire
“crowd.” Thus, although ASSOB does not provide an ideal prototype
for a vision of equity crowdfunding in the United States, it does
suggest a that a similar model could work. In any case, equity
crowdfunding must first be tested and experimented with to remove
any uncertainty—a task for which states are uniquely suited.
C.

The Advantages of State Regulation of Crowdfunding

State legislators may be wary of passing a state crowdfunding
exemption because a federal exemption is near, especially once the
SEC passes the rules necessary to implement crowdfunding in the
United States. Even if the federal exemption is imminent,
crowdfunding may nonetheless be more appropriate for intrastate,
rather than national, offerings. Consequently, regulators have opined
that the SEC’s resources are better spent elsewhere.201 Regulating
crowdfunding at the local level makes sense because most projects
will be smaller, local projects.202 Local economic conditions tend to
have stronger effects on small business, independent of the national
economy.203 Moreover, given the small size of crowdfunded offerings,
issuers, and individual investment amounts, states “have a more direct
interest in these offerings.”204 Likewise, states are “in a better position
to communicate with both the issuer and the investor to ensure that
this exemption is an effective means of small business capital
formation.”205 Finally, amid the major void of data available on the
implications of crowdfunding, states should be empowered to fulfill
199. See supra notes 78–86 and accompanying text.
200. Crowd Funding—Lessons Learned in 8 Years of Equity Crowd Funding, supra
note 190.
201. The JOBS Act at a Year and a Half: Assessing Progress and Unmet Opportunities:
Hearing S. 113-178 Before the S. Subcomm. on Sec., Ins. & Inv. of the S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 60 (2013) (statement of Rick Fleming,
Deputy General Counsel, North American Securities Administrators Association).
202. See id.
203. See, e.g., id.; Wendell Cox, How Texas Avoided the Great Recession,
NEWGEOGRAPHY (July 20, 2010), http://www.newgeography.com/content/001680-howtexas-avoided-great-recession [http://perma.cc/AL5P-DG95] (“Texas . . . fully escaped the
“housing bubble” that did so much damage in California, Florida, Arizona, Nevada and
other states.”).
204. See The JOBS Act at a Year and a Half: Assessing Progress and Unmet
Opportunities: Hearing S. 113-178 Before the S. Subcomm. on Sec., Ins. & Inv. of the S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, supra note 201.
205. Id.
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their traditional roles as experimental laboratories in exploring equity
crowdfunding.206 In any case, providing access to crowdfunded capital
to entrepreneurs remains a prerogative and perhaps even a
responsibility exclusive to the states.
VI. “WE CAN DO BETTER”: A NEW AND IMPROVED NORTH
CAROLINA CROWDFUNDING EXEMPTION PROPOSAL
North Carolina’s crowdfunding framework must focus on a
reasonable regulatory balance that minimizes unnecessary costs and
burdens on small businesses and startups, while protecting investors
from undue loss, fraud, and abuse. H.B. 680 was a prudent bill that
could have achieved that balance. This proposal retains many of H.B.
680’s provisions, while proposing certain improvements.
First, a new North Carolina crowdfunding exemption (the
“proposal”) should retain several of H.B. 680’s provisions, including
H.B. 680’s offering limits, offering-amount triggered disclosures,
aggregate individual unaccredited investor limits, the “all-or-nothing”
rule, and post-offering disclosure requirements, with some exceptions.
This proposal can improve inherent shortcomings in H.B. 680’s
disclosure requirements, including excessive costs, lack of utility, and
risk of fraud by: (1) providing for standardized disclosures; (2)
removing the requirement that issuers provide a “statement of
significant risks,” in lieu of more general statements of risk; (3)
providing for mandated investor education requirements; (4)
promoting competition among intermediaries; (5) providing for
mandated social networking features on intermediaries’ funding
portals; (6) requiring intermediaries to retain at least fifteen to
twenty-five percent of investor losses in the event of fraud; and (7)
loosening H.B. 680’s resale restriction in lieu of vesting intermediaries
with discretion to establish interportal, intrastate, secondary markets
for crowdfunded securities.
A. Proposed Offering Limits and Disclosures Triggered by Certain
Offering Amounts
The proposal should retain the offering limits and related
disclosures proposed under H.B. 680. By not overburdening small

206. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 773 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may,
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.” (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).
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companies with the costs of stringent reporting and compliance
requirements, the relevant provisions of the original bill were
sufficient to prevent prospective North Carolina startups from
moving opportunistically to other states with less burdensome
crowdfunding regulations. Additionally, reports produced by
companies with little if any operating history would be useless to
investors.207 Moreover, H.B. 680’s original limits—up to $1 million
uninhibited by additional disclosures or expensive reporting
requirements and up to $2 million with audited financial
statements208—attracted overwhelming bipartisan support.209
While there is no “magic number,”210 $1 million establishes a
significant capital base for a company in its initial startup stages.
Requiring audited financial statements for companies seeking over
$1 million to $2 million seems reasonable given the higher amount of
the offering, especially since those companies are more likely to have
the requisite operating history and growth targets to justify requiring
audited financial statements.211
Raising these limits would likely provide no substantial benefits.
While higher limits may make North Carolina more attractive to
issuers seeking to use the exemption, neither any state exemption nor
the federal exemption currently offer limits higher than $2 million.212
These limits strike the right balance of minimizing burdens to smaller
businesses at their most vulnerable stages and requiring further
disclosures when businesses seek larger offerings after they have had
207. See, e.g., Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting
Investors: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong.
64 (2011) (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia
University Law School) (noting that any company raising only $1 million is likely to be an
early-stage startup with little operating history “or, possibly, even [without] financial
statements”); Damodaran, supra note 42, at 5 (“The limited history that is available for
young companies is rendered even less useful by the fact that there is little operating detail
in them. Revenues are small or non-existent . . . and the expenses often are associated with
getting the business established, rather than generating revenues. In combination, they
result in significant operating losses.”); Georgia Quinn, SBA Office of Advocacy Requests
Redo by SEC on Crowdfunding Regulations, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Jan. 17, 2014, 10:06
AM), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2014/01/30154-sba-office-advocacy-asks-redo-seccrowdfunding-regulations/ [http://perma.cc/B32T-C8X9].
208. H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(3)(b).
209. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
210. Bradford, supra note 48, at 118.
211. See, e.g., Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting
Investors: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, supra note
207, at 66–67 (“Because the maximum aggregate amount that may be raised in any 12month period is $1 million, this exemption is likely to be used primarily by early stage
issuers that do not yet have an operating history or, possibly, even financial statements.”).
212. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(i) (2012); infra note 214.
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some success.213 Likewise, lowering these limits increases the risk that
prospective North Carolina startups will move to other states with
more favorable limits, most of which currently mirror H.B. 680’s
limits.214 The North Carolina JOBS Act would have only required
issuers seeking to raise greater than $1 million to provide audited
financial statements.215 The federal exemption, by contrast, requires
audited financials from issuers seeking to raise only $500,000.216
Further, provisions requiring audited financial statements for
small offerings217 undermine the purpose of the crowdfunding
exemption.218 Audits are overly burdensome to small business
startups because they are so costly.219 The SEC’s proposed rules
estimated costs of $4,000 for the preparation and filing of the annual
report for offerings of $100,000 or less; $14,350 for an annual review
for offerings between $100,000 and $500,000; and $28,700 for the
213. See Damodaran, supra note 42, at 4–5 (describing the typical small business’s early
struggles for revenue and later profitability).
214. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-6-11(a)(14)(c) (West, Westlaw through Act 2015-520)
(providing that issuers may raise up to $1 million without audited financials); IND. CODE
ANN. § 23-19-2-2(27)(C) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.) (providing that
issuers may raise up to $1 million without, and $2 million with audited financials); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 451.2202a(1)(c) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Mich. Pub. Acts 130)
(providing that issuers may raise up to $1 million without, and $2 million with audited
financials); WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(c)(1)(a) (2013) (providing that issuers may raise up
to $1 million without, and $2 million with audited financials); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 5904-2.08(1)(c) (West, Westlaw through July 31, 2015) (providing that issuers may raise up to
$1 million without audited financials); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 81-5-21(a)(3) (2013)
(providing that issuers may raise up to $1 million without audited financials). But see ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 16304(6-A)(B) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 377 of the 2015 1st
Reg. Sess.) (providing that issuers may raise up to $1 million but issuers raising over
$500,000 must provide audited financials).
215. H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(3)(b).
216. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(1)(D)(iii) (2013).
217. See, e.g., § 77d(a)(6)(A) (2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 16304(6A)(E)(5)(c) (West, Westlaw through ch. 377 of the 2015 1st Reg. Sess.) (requiring audited
financials for offerings greater than $500,000).
218. Companies using the crowdfunding exemption to offer up to $1 million in
securities annually would be required to provide the same level of financial disclosure
required of an emerging growth company, which may have revenue up to $1 billion, when
conducting an IPO of unlimited size. See Comment Letter from Ernst & Young, LLP to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 2 (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.ey.com/Publication
/vwLUAssets/CommentLetter_CC0389_Crowdfunding_3February2014/$FILE/CommentLet
ter_CC0389_Crowdfunding_3February2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/LC8F-GBTQ] [hereinafter
EY Comment Letter]. Furthermore, it would be challenging for the principal executive
officer to provide U.S. GAAP-basis financial statements without engaging a financial
expert. Id. at 3.
219. An audit costs around “$15,000 to $20,000 for the smallest businesses and $50,000
to $75,000 for middle-market businesses.” Gwen Moran, Looking to Borrow? An Audited
Financial Statement Can Help, ENTREPRENEUR (Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.entrepreneur
.com/article/222806 [http://perma.cc/M3PU-7CQU].
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requisite annual audit for companies raising $500,000 or more.220
Though inconsequential for established businesses, these costs can be
extremely detrimental to a small business.221 Moreover, in addition to
requiring issuers to pay for such audits,222 the costs to issuers of
compliance and reporting would devour a significant chunk of capital,
discouraging the use of the crowdfunding exemption.223 The SBA
Office of Advocacy224 (“SBA Advocacy”) addressed this very concern
when it submitted to the SEC its second comment letter in five
years.225 Advocacy explained that forcing small businesses, which
often have little or no revenue, to produce audited financial
statements would be extremely detrimental relative to their cash
flows and the levels of capital they seek to raise.226
Worse, issuers would be required to incur these expenses up
front, prior to qualifying for a crowdfunded offering.227 There is a
substantial risk that after incurring these costs, the market may not
support the issuer’s products, thus deterring issuers from using the
exemption at all.228 Issuers may be incentivized to minimize these

220. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,521 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, and 249).
221. In fact, this has been a source of concern expressed in various SEC comment
letters. See, e.g., Comment Letter from Kiran Lingam, Gen. Counsel, SeedInvest, LLC, to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 1 (Jan. 22, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-0913/s70913-139.pdf [https://perma.cc/UR9D-DWDP] (“The majority of startups will have a
tough time financing this level of upfront costs ahead of conducting a crowdfunding
raise.”); see infra notes 227–35 and accompanying text.
222. The SEC estimates that offerings of $100,000 or less will cost issuers between
$2,500 and $7,500; offerings between $100,001 and $500,000 will cost issuers between
$15,000 and $45,000; and offerings greater than $500,000 will cost issuers between $37,500
and $112,500. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,521.
223. See EY Comment Letter, supra note 218, at 1.
224. The Small Business Administration’s Office of Advocacy was established in 1980,
in part to protect small businesses from “unnecessary and disproportionately
burdensome” regulatory requirements. See Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-354,
94 Stat. 1164 (1980).
225. Quinn, supra note 207.
226. See Comment Letter from Winslow Sargeant, Ph.D, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 1–2 (Jan. 16, 2014), https://www.sba.gov/content/1162014crowdfunding-file-number-s7-09-13 [http://perma.cc/F7Y8-KE6X] [hereinafter Sargeant
Letter].
227. See H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(3)(b) (requiring issuers raising
over $1 million to produce pre-offering audited financials).
228. See R. Kevin Saunders II, Note, Power to the People: How the SEC Can Empower
the Crowd, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 945, 961 (2014).
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preliminary costs229 by choosing a lower target-offering amount,
“leaving the company undercapitalized and more prone to failure.”230
Even if these expenses were tolerable, the financial audits and
burdensome reporting requirements noted above miss the point.
Their purpose is not to inform investors about the economic
prospects of an investment, but rather to enable investors to make a
fully informed investment.231 Audited financials produced by
companies with minimal, if any, operational history or revenue are
useless to investors.232 Indeed, venture capitalists rarely request
audited financials,233 likely realizing the opportunity cost to their
invested dollars, which may be better spent elsewhere. Certainly,
concerns related to the riskiness of crowdfunded companies and fraud
in online securities offerings are not without merit.234 But these
concerns can be effectively mitigated in ways less burdensome to
small issuers.235
Nonetheless, offering limits and their accompanying disclosures
are irrelevant unless issuers can solicit enough investors to buy into
the issuers’ ideas. The next section discusses the intricacies of these
challenges and the balance between limiting investor losses and
easing issuers’ capital-raising efforts.
B.

Proposed Aggregate Annual Limits on Individual Investor
Contributions

The proposed exemption should retain H.B. 680’s $2,000 fixed
aggregate annual limit on individual unaccredited investor
contributions.236 The costs and complexity of verifying investor
financials weigh against imposing a variable cap. Instead, the fixed
229. See supra notes 215–20 and accompanying text.
230. Saunders, supra note 228, at 962; see also J. Tol Broome Jr., Avoiding the Traps
That Cause New Businesses To Fail, ANVIL MAG., Jan. 2001, http://www.anvilmag.com
/comment/101f2.htm [http://perma.cc/BC9P-565J] (noting that undercapitalization is the
“number one small-business killer”).
231. Louis Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER’S WKLY., Dec. 20, 1913, at 12,
http://www.law.louisville.edu/library/collections/brandeis/node/196 [http://perma.cc/DBX4
-9YML] (“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient
policeman.”).
232. See, e.g., Damodaran, supra note 42, at 5 (“The limited history that is available for
young companies is rendered even less useful by the fact that there is little operating detail
in them. Revenues are small or non-existent . . . and the expenses often are associated with
getting the business established, rather than generating revenues. In combination, they
result in significant operating losses.”); Quinn, supra note 207.
233. See Quinn, supra note 207.
234. See supra Section V.B.
235. See infra Section VI.D.
236. H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(4) (2013).
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amount should be reasonable to protect investors from risk of loss
and fraud. “Reasonable” means not too high, thus protecting
investors from risk of loss and fraud, but not too low, threatening the
feasibility of crowdfunding as a capital-raising alternative.
A variable approach ensures that investors’ crowdfunding
investments are limited to a specific proportion of their income or net
worth, effectively limiting the investor’s potential investment to a sum
the investor can afford.237 By contrast, a fixed limit applies equally to
all investors, not all of whom can reasonably afford the same
investments. The lower the investor’s income or net worth, the less
affordable a fixed limit becomes.238
Nonetheless, fixed limits are more easily administered. Oddly,
the SEC’s proposed rules do not require intermediaries to verify that
each investor’s income is in compliance with aggregate investment
limits for individual investors under a variable approach.239 Rather,
investors would self-certify,240 leaving intermediaries to simply rely on
investor representations.241 Even if intermediaries were required to
verify investor income, the risks and costs to both parties might be
prohibitive.242
Regardless, it is unclear whether a variable limit could actually
be enforced under a self-certification regime. Investors could falsely
certify or overstate their income or net worth, defeating the purpose
of the individual investment limit.243 Even honest investors may
237. See Bradford, supra note 48, at 129–30.
238. For example, consider a bus driver whose income is $15,000 per year. If she
invested $2,000 into a venture that fails, that sum represents almost 14% of her income.
But if her investment is capped at 3% of her income, she can only invest $450, a much
more manageable loss.
239. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,470 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, and 249).
240. See id.
241. See id. For example, investors who exceed their contribution limits could continue
to circumvent the rule because there would be no enforcement authority.
242. Investors may be forced to divulge additional information necessary for
intermediaries to calculate income or net worth to comply with investment limits—
information not limited to income taxes, paystubs, or other documents that include one’s
social security number and other personal identifying information. This could expose
investors (especially where fraud is concerned), and it may even deter investors from
participating, contrary to the JOBS Act’s objective—making funds more available. See
JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, pmbl., 126 Stat. 306, 306 (to be codified in various section
of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa, 78a-pp). Moreover, verifying this information would impose
additional compliance costs on intermediaries. Those costs, including hiring and training
additional employees and creating compliance programs associated with individual
investment limits, would likely be passed on to issuers and investors.
243. SEC’s Crowdfunding Proposal: Will it Work for Small Businesses?: Hearing
Before H. Subcomm. on Investigations, Oversight, & Regulations of the Comm. on Small
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mistakenly overstate their income or net worth when self-certifying,
increasing the likelihood of financial distress in the event of loss.244
For example, an investor may mistakenly believe that the value of her
home may be counted towards her net worth, resulting in a risky
crowdfunding investment that represents a large part of her savings.245
A fixed investment cap provides a simpler and less expensive246
approach than the federal JOBS Act’s variable approach.247
Therefore, the wisest way to limit individual investments is to provide
for a fixed dollar limit.
Without quantifiable data on the “best” fixed individual
investment limit,248 increasing or decreasing H.B. 680’s original $2,000
investment limit249 would be largely arbitrary.250 The $2,000 cap is
reasonable, neither too high nor too low.251 There are at least three
reasons to maintain the $2,000 individual aggregate investment limit.
First, “a uniform limit, unless it is very small, does not necessarily
limit all investors to an amount they can afford to lose.”252 Moreover,
adopting the higher, $5,000–$10,000 limits seen in other states253 may
frustrate bipartisan support by reducing investor protection. If passed,

Bus., 113th Cong. 8 (2014) (statement of Mercer Bullard, President, Fund Democracy, Inc.),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg86267/html/CHRG-113hhrg86267.htm
[http://perma.cc/G7VF-Q6ZQ].
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See Bradford, supra note 48, at 127–28.
247. See Section III.A.2.
248. See Bradford, supra note 48, at 129.
249. H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(4).
250. Cf. Hazen, supra note 179, at 1765 (“It is naïve to assume that limiting offerings to
small amounts per investor will deter scammers from taking advantage of investors via
crowdfunding. Even limiting the exemption to relatively small amounts such as $250 or
$500 does not mean that there is an insufficient investor-protection stake such that
scrutiny is not warranted.”).
251. For example, the $10,000 limit seen in some states, like Wisconsin, WIS. STAT.
§ 551.202(26)(d) (2013), could subject unwary investors to catastrophic losses. Other states
have already attributed lower limits, like the former $1,000 limit in Kansas, to failures. See
Simon & Loten, supra note 145.
252. See Bradford, supra note 48, at 127 (advocating for a $500 individual investment
limit).
253. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-6-11(a)(14)-d (West, Westlaw through Act 2015-520)
(providing for $5,000 limit); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-19-2-2(27)(E) (West, Westlaw through
2015 1st Reg. Sess.) (providing for $5,000 limit); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 16304(6A) (West, Westlaw through ch. 377 of the 2015 1st Reg. Sess.) (providing for $5,000 limit);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 451.2202a(1)(d) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Mich. Pub.
Acts 130) (providing for $10,000 limit); WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(c)(1)(a) (2013)
(providing for $10,000 limit); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 590-4-2.08(1)(d) (West, Westlaw
through July 31, 2015) (providing for $10,000 limit). But see KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 81-521(a)(4) (2013) (providing for $1,000 limit).
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higher limits may subject “foolhardy investors” to unbearable
losses.254 Indeed, it may be wise to adopt a cautious approach given
the uncertainty and potentially unforeseen risks associated with
equity crowdfunding.255
Second, a reasonable limit on individual investment is consistent
with the purpose of equity crowdfunding, which is premised on
soliciting a large, aggregate amount of funds from many small,
individual contributions.256 Thus, a lower limit would not compromise
the utility of an equity crowdfunding exemption. However, similar to
low target-offering limits, an individual investment limit that is too
low may frustrate offering success.257 Dismal offering prospects may
cause prospective issuers to move to other states that provide for
higher individual investment contributions.258 Moreover, lower
investment caps are irrelevant if the investors they seek to protect are
not participating in crowdfunding. That is, if low-income investors are
investing responsibly or not participating in crowdfunding at all, then
the costs of limiting the investment base outweigh any protective
benefit to a miniscule minority of investors. Indeed, low-income
Americans, unlike wealthier investors, tend to favor the safest
investments, despite their lower performance.259 Even lower-income
254. See Bradford, supra note 48, at 140; Hazen, supra note 179, at 1766
(“[Crowdfunding] also is likely to attract investors with limited funds who cannot tolerate
high investment risk, even for small amounts of money.”).
255. See supra Section V.B.
256. See supra notes 67–72 and accompanying text.
257. In fact, after Kansas issuers complained of difficulties in reaching their target
offering amounts, Kansas increased its $1,000 individual investment limit, attributing
failures to the low limit. See Simon & Loten, supra note 145 (explaining that Kansas
increased its individual unaccredited investor cap from $1,000 to $5,000). Note also that
Kansas has a smaller population relative to many other states, thus a smaller investment
base to draw from. For example, as of July 2013, Kansas’s population was 2.984 million.
Public Data, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=kf7tgg1uo9ude_
&met_y=population&idim=state:20000:29000:31000&hl=en&dl=en#!ctype=l&strail=false
&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=population&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=country&idim
=state:20000:37000&ifdim=country&hl=en_US&dl=en&ind=false
[http://perma.cc/SJ7BVKA4] (comparing the population growth of North Carolina to Kansas over the previous
century). Compare that to North Carolina’s population, which was 9.481 million as of July
2013. Id. Thus, a higher $5,000 cap is probably not necessary in North Carolina.
258. See, e.g., supra note 257.
259. For example, low-income Americans favor gold over the stocks, bonds, and real
estate favored by wealthier investors, despite the fact that gold has had the lowest returns
over the last 200 years of any of those investment classes. John Aziz, Why the Poor’s
Investment of Choice Is So Alarming, THE WEEK (Apr. 23, 2014), http://theweek.com
/article/index/260333/why-the-poors-investment-of-choice-is-so-alarming [http://perma.cc
/VXW6-ZK5L]. Likewise, given that these investors even prefer “plain-vanilla savings
accounts and CDs over stocks,” it is unlikely that crowdfunded securities would appear
attractive to them. See Jeff Cox, Lower-Income Investors Still Cling to Gold Hopes, CNBC
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Americans that do prefer “safer” investments represent a small subset
of low-earners, however, because most low-income Americans
abstain from investing at all.260
Third, the potential alternatives to a lower individual investment
limit are unwise. Supporters of the individual investment cap have
characterized it as “the fundamental investor protection in
crowdfunding.”261 As noted above, the administrative challenges to
implementing a variable approach are burdensome, and permitting
self-certification under such a regime could subject investors to
unbearable losses. Alternatively, a “free-market” approach, where
investors could invest any amount of money risks subjecting investors
to losses limited only by the investor’s liquidity.262 Likewise, if
intermediaries, competing for investors, are charged with determining
individual investor contribution limits, intermediaries could establish
either unlimited or very high individual investment limits to attract
more investors. Either of the preceding alternatives, which fail to
protect investors, would likewise fail to attract bipartisan support.
The reasonable $2,000 aggregate investment limit for individuals
in H.B. 680 addresses these concerns—it is neither too high, nor too
low.263 It targets a broad swathe of investors without blindly seeking
(Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101603207 [http://perma.cc/83Z5-XYWE].
Differences in financial literacy, attitudes about future prospects of the economy, and
familiarity, among other reasons, account for the difference. See id. Lower-income
investors, in contrast to wealthy investors, prefer gold, which is a safer, pessimistic
investment that will have value even when society breaks down. See id. “Rich people are
by definition those who are doing well within the current economic system, while poor
people are by definition not doing so well within it. So it’s totally unsurprising that the rich
are expressing higher levels of confidence in a system they are doing well within, and the
poor are expressing lower levels of confidence.” See Aziz, supra.
260. For example, in a 2012 Financial Capability study, 18% of respondents with
incomes below $25,000 tried to plan for retirement, and only 11% of that group had
nonretirement investments. FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., INV. EDUC. FOUND.,
FINANCIAL CAPABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 14, 16 (2012), http://www
.usfinancialcapability.org/downloads/NFCS_2012_Report_Natl_Findings.pdf [http://perma
.cc/9ZF5-ESE6].
261. Saunders, supra note 228, at 972; see also Andrew A. Schwartz,
Keeping It Light, Chairman White: SEC Rulemaking Under the Crowdfunding Act, 66
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 43, 60 (2013) (“The annual cap is so important to the entire
statutory scheme that the SEC should properly place a relatively heavy burden on
intermediaries to enforce it.”).
262. See, e.g., Madoff Victims Recount the Long Road Back, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 9, 2013,
6:21 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303560204579248221657387860
[http://perma.cc/5DXA-M284 (staff-uploaded archive)] (discussing several victims who
lost their entire savings to fraudster Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme).
263. However, the paternalism inherent in limiting individual investment in
crowdfunding strikes the author as ironic, considering that Americans are free to do many
risky things with their money. For instance, Americans “are perfectly within their rights
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to protect a small group of merely potential investors or
compromising equity crowdfunding’s feasibility as an alternative
capital-raising mechanism. This provision is protective enough to
generate the bipartisan support that the bill will need in order to pass,
particularly when accompanied by other provisions specifically
designed to protect vulnerable investors.264
C.

The “All-or-Nothing” Provision

North Carolina’s equity crowdfunding exemption should also
retain H.B. 680’s “all-or-nothing” provision. This provision requires
that offering proceeds be held in escrow and released if and when the
issuer’s campaign reaches the target-offering amount, as stated in the
issuer’s pre-offering disclosures.265 Until the target is reached,
investors should be able to withdraw their investments.266 Combining
the “all-or-nothing” provision with the option to withdraw creates
several protective benefits. First, it protects investors from losses
resulting from making risky investments in undercapitalized
companies. Second, it maintains checks on issuers by promoting
responsiveness in funding-portal communication, weeding out
potentially unsuccessful companies. Third, the “all-or-nothing” and
optional withdrawal provisions encourage diligent planning.
The “all-or-nothing” provision helps prevent investor losses in
unattractive ventures by shifting to issuers the risk of loss due to
undercapitalization. Moreover, since the “crowd” is comprised of a
diverse array of investors, sophisticated and unsophisticated,267 the
“all-or-nothing” provision makes it more difficult for unscrupulous
issuers to poach unsophisticated or “foolhardy” investors.268 An “allor-nothing” provision works in tandem with interactive portals
because investors can continue to share information while the
offering is open, resulting in a more informed “crowd.”269 If an

under current law to go to Las Vegas or Atlantic City and bet their entire lifesavings on
one roll of the dice,” but are unable to invest their chosen amount in a crowdfunding
venture. See 158 CONG. REC. H1222-04 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2012) (statement of Rep.
Polis). If it is true that “[t]he line between gambling and investing is artificial and thin,” it
seems inconsistent to allow unlimited gambling, but not unlimited investment. MICHAEL
LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT 256 (2010).
264. See supra Section VI.A; infra Sections VI.C–G.
265. H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(5)(c).
266. See id.
267. See infra text accompanying notes 388–90.
268. See Bradford, supra note 48, at 140.
269. See id. at 139–40.
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investor “conclude[s], based on information shared, that an offering is
not a suitable investment[,]” she can withdraw her bid.270
Of course, the more liberal “all-or-something” provisions found
in other state exemptions271 are not without merit. An issuer may
avoid undercapitalization when retaining some of its offering
proceeds, which may occur when the issuer covers upfront costs
pursuant to its crowdfunded offering.272 The reduced risk will
encourage more issuers to use the crowdfunding exemption,
diversifying funding portal offerings and attracting more investors.
Nonetheless, undercapitalization is just as likely to occur when
funding falls far short of the issuer’s operating requirements, which is
much more likely under an “all-or-something” regime. Then, in the
event of failure, the loss is wholly owned by the investors, who were
either unwilling or unable to withdraw their funds in the underfunded
company. Furthermore, the threat that investors may withdraw their
funds before the issuer reaches its target creates a greater incentive
for issuers to be more responsive when communicating over funding
portals. This communication mutually benefits both parties.273 Issuers
receive free, tailored recommendations to improve their businesses.274
Investors and customers can voice their concerns. Likewise, the “allor-nothing” provision provides an early indicator of success or
failure.275 The issuer must convince investors that its venture is worth
the risk.276 Thus, the market can reject the issuer’s idea before
crowdfunding participants risk their money in an issuer’s unworthy
venture.
Finally, an “all-or-nothing” provision prevents issuers from
overreaching or setting arbitrary targets.277 Since the offering will fail
if it falls short of its target, issuers will budget more diligently.278 The
“all-or-nothing” provision, therefore, protects vulnerable investors
and incentivizes issuers to be responsive and diligent without

270. Id.
271. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-19-2-2(27)(F)(vi) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st
Reg. Sess.) (permitting investors to choose whether to cancel the investor’s commitment
to invest if the target goal is not reached before the deadline stated in the disclosure).
272. See supra notes 227–30 and accompanying text.
273. See infra Section VI.D.4.
274. See Bradford, supra note 48, at 135 (suggesting that recommendations may “help
the entrepreneur refine her business plan”).
275. Cf. supra notes 130–131 and accompanying text.
276. See Richard A. Epstein, The Political Economy of Crowdsourcing: Markets for
Labor, Rewards, and Security, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 35, 44–45 (2015).
277. See Bradford, supra note 48, at 140.
278. Id.
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significantly impeding issuers’ ability to utilize crowdfunding to raise
capital.
Like most other provisions, the effectiveness of the “all-ornothing” provision substantially depends on the disclosure
requirements because of the upfront costs that disclosure
requirements impose on issuers, as discussed above.
D. Proposed Pre-Offering and Post-Offering Disclosures and
Reporting Requirements
As discussed throughout this Comment, nearly all provisions
inherent in an effective crowdfunding regulatory regime depend upon
useful, effective, and affordable disclosures, including the “all-ornothing” provision, investor contribution limits, investor education,
intermediary regulation, and resale restrictions. North Carolina
should improve on H.B. 680’s disclosure requirements, which would
have required extensive and sometimes ambiguous issuer-drafted
disclosures.279
Before
explaining
recommended
disclosure
requirements under the proposed exemption, it is helpful to
understand the benefits and shortcomings inherent in certain
disclosures.
1. Overburdening Small Issuers with Excessive Costs and Liability
Disclosures are undoubtedly necessary because they provide
investors with the information required to make informed investment
decisions.280 Disclosures may also prove useful for appraisal purposes,
especially since crowdfunded securities will be illiquid, and thus not
easily valued if resale restrictions are retained.281 More importantly,
mandatory disclosures help to prevent investors from being duped by

279. For example, H.B. 680 required “a discussion of significant factors that make a
particular offering risky,” while also requiring issuers to display on the cover page of their
disclosure documents a legend that warned investors of the risks of crowdfunded
securities. H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(13). The bill also required issuers
to provide information regarding the differences among classes of securities. Id. sec. 2,
§ 78A-17.1(a)(5)(b)(4).
280. See Brandeis, supra note 231, at 12.
281. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S
HANDBOOK: UNIQUE AND HARD-TO-VALUE ASSETS 18 (Aug. 2012) (explaining
potential difficulty with determining “hard to value or illiquid assets”); see also Azam
Ahmed, For Sale: Illiquid Assets, Hard To Value, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Mar. 28, 2011,
3:09 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/03/28/for-sale-illiquid-assets-hard-to-value
/?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/W7HV-JFA2] (explaining hedge fund managers’ use of “sidepockets” for illiquid investments such as toxic loans that would be sold at fire-sale prices
after the financial crisis).
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fraudsters, who historically have been successful at developing
innovative scams in response to new technologies.282
Disclosures, however, do not achieve these goals unless they are
meaningful.283 Moreover, excessive disclosure requirements frustrate
the core purpose of any crowdfunding exemption—increasing
accessibility of capital to startups and small businesses.284 Many of the
required disclosures under H.B. 680285 and other state exemptions286
implicate “complex areas of corporate law and finance.”287 Under
H.B. 680, issuers would likely be required to enlist professional legal
and financial expertise to draft disclosure forms containing details
regarding the issuer’s capital structure, rights and comparisons among
its security classes, and quarterly reports.288 Similar to audited
financial statements, such disclosures may be prohibitively expensive
for small issuers to produce.289
282. Hazen, supra note 179, at 1767–68 (describing how several types of fraud schemes,
including boiler-room sales operations, “pump-and-dump” schemes, and Ponzi schemes,
have adapted to take advantage of new technologies). For a colorful illustration of how
such operations work, see generally JORDAN BELFORT, THE WOLF OF WALL STREET
(2013) (describing the rise and fall of Jordan Belfort, who founded Stratton Oakmont, a
brokerage house that engaged in pump and dump schemes and other forms of securities
fraud); see also What Is a Boiler Room Operation?, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia
.com/ask/answers/04/080604.asp [http://perma.cc/8W5Y-8QFS]. Bernie Madoff operated a
successful “Ponzi” scheme, in which he duped unsuspecting investors with promises of
large returns and virtually no risk, only to pocket the investors’ cash for himself. See Diana
B. Henriques, Madoff Scheme Kept Rippling Outward, Across Borders, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
19, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/20/business/20madoff.html?pagewanted=all&
_r=1& [http://perma.cc/G3D4-QK9B (dark archive)]. When the investors wanted to cash
out, Madoff paid from the pool of other investors’ funds. See id. Madoff drew some
skepticism as he consistently reported returns well above market rates, but it was not until
the credit crunch in 2008 when Madoff’s scheme collapsed as investors rapidly pulled out
their money. See id.
283. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 208.84(c)(6) (mandating meaningful disclosures). See
generally ERNST & YOUNG, DISCLOSURE EFFECTIVENESS (2014), http://www.ey.com
/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-disclosure-effectiveness-what-companies-can-donow/$FILE/EY-disclosure-effectiveness-what-companies-can-do-now.pdf [http://perma.cc
/K3UL-9KGA] (describing how to make corporate disclosures more meaningful).
284. See supra Section VI.A.
285. See H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(5)(b) (requiring disclosures such
as a description of the company’s capital structure, the terms and potential modifications
to securities, the differences among classes of securities, and how other classes of securities
may affect the rights of crowdfunded securities).
286. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 16304(6-A)(E)(6) (West, Westlaw
through ch. 377 of the 2015 1st Reg. Sess.) (requiring a detailed description of the issuer’s
capital structure).
287. John S. Wroldsen, The Social Network and the Crowdfund Act: Zuckerberg,
Saverin, and Venture Capitalists’ Dilution of the Crowd, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 583,
600 (2013).
288. H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(5), (c).
289. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
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At the same time, asking issuers to prepare a “discussion of
significant factors that make the offering speculative or risky”290 is not
only redundant, but will likely require the employ of a securities
attorney and possibly even an accountant, further increasing the
upfront cost to the issuer.291 Furthermore, certifying a statement that
outlines significant risks associated with the issuer subjects the issuer
to uncertain levels of potential liability notwithstanding good faith.292
It would be impossible to forecast all significant risks, especially for
startups with limited or no operating history and no point of reference
to identify such “significant” risks.293 Would a statement as general as
“we could fail and lose your entire investment” be sufficient?
Naturally, with a startup this is a significant risk, but these types of
generic risks are better disclosed elsewhere in the form of a general
disclaimer.294 Of course, this type of information is less specific, but a
relaxed disclosure requirement would prevent issuers from subjecting
themselves to liability potentially equaling the purchase price of the
offered securities,295 thus reducing an issuer’s litigation risk without
unduly degrading investor information when sufficient alternative
disclosures are provided.296
Thus, disclosures are necessary, but overburdening issuers with
excessive costs and potential liability—only to provide disclosures
that do not satisfy their purpose—is not helpful to issuers or investors.
The next section discusses disclosures that overburden investors with
too much information, or incomprehensible information, which is a
significant part of the problem.

290. See H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(13).
291. See ANNE M. KHADEMIAN, THE SEC AND CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION:
THE POLITICS OF EXPERTISE 91 (1992) (noting broad demand for securities lawyers and
the law firms that employ them).
292. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law
from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CALIF.
L. REV. 627, 627 (1996) (“When risky investments go wrong, brokers and customers may
blame each other for the misfortune. Courts and others resolving these disputes must then
decide whether the broker withheld information about the risk, or whether the customer
knew about the risk and simply made a bad decision.”).
293. Even venture capitalists require some operating history to perform due diligence.
See Venture Capital, supra note 35.
294. See H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(7) (requiring issuers
intermediaries to provide a legend to apprise investors of the general risks of investing in
crowdfunded securities).
295. See infra note 409 and accompanying text.
296. See infra Sections VI.D.3–4 (proposing a simplification of the disclosure process
by limiting the amount of complex information and providing simple, standardized
disclosure forms).
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2. Limits on Disclosure Value for “Unsophisticated” Investors
Even if the information described above could be had at a low
cost, of what value is it to “unsophisticated” and nontraditional retail
investors? The theoretical effectiveness of such disclosures for
investor-protection purposes is informed by two assumptions: that (1)
“unsophisticated” investors read the disclosures; and (2) they are fully
capable of understanding the disclosures.297 Indeed, the Supreme
Court’s “reasonable investor” standard explicitly endorses these
expectations.298 Moreover, “courts expect reasonable investors to
have an awareness of general economic conditions and to understand
the principles of diversification, the time-value of money, the nature
of margin accounts, and the securities industry’s compensation
structure.”299 Theoretically, investors use information contained in
disclosures to value an issuer’s securities or to make informed
predictions on the economic prospects of the issuer.300 However,
studies consistently show that a significant proportion of retail
investors lack even basic financial literacy—a necessity for
understanding these disclosures—which undermines the entire
rationale for disclosure requirements.301
Furthermore, the volume of information contained in the
prescribed securities disclosures can create cognitively-crippling
297. Barbara Black, Behavioral Economics and Investor Protection: Reasonable
Investors, Efficient Markets, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1493, 1495–96 (2013) (“For example, a
widow with a tenth grade education was expected to read and understand written
disclosures about risk and illiquidity in a lengthy complex prospectus . . . .”).
298. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 233–34 (1988) (rejecting the notion that
“investors are nitwits” and explaining that investors should not be ascribed “child-like
simplicity”) (quoting Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 1987)); see also
Black, supra note 297, at 1493–95 (noting the high degree of rationality ascribed to
investors by courts and questioning whether that standard “comport[s] with observed
reality”).
299. See Black, supra note 297, at 1494–95 (citing several cases where federal courts
held the reasonable investor to meet relatively high standards of financial literacy).
300. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-698, MUNICIPAL
SECURITIES: OPTIONS FOR IMPROVING CONTINUING DISCLOSURE 16 (2012), http://www
.gao.gov/assets/600/592669.pdf [http://perma.cc/2ETJ-325K] (recognizing that investors use
disclosures to make investment decisions despite the fact that there is limited information
on to what extent investors use disclosures); Beginners’ Guide to Financial Statements,
SEC, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/begfinstmtguide.htm [http://perma.cc/Y9VL-V8SD]
(asserting that financial statements provide “powerful information for investors[,] . . . the
investor’s best tool when it comes to investing wisely”).
301. See, e.g., SEC, STUDY REGARDING FINANCIAL LITERACY AMONG INVESTORS
vii-viii (2012) [hereinafter FINANCIAL LITERACY], http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012
/917-financial-literacy-study-part1.pdf [http://perma.cc/JSB2-Y875] (“[S]tudies have found
that investors do not understand the most elementary financial concepts, such as
compound interest and inflation.”).
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information overload, causing investors to limit their attention to
disclosures or avoid them altogether.302 In fact, an SEC study
identified these concerns and suggested that disclosures be provided
in summary form with “concise, plain language descriptions of
important information.”303 At least one state’s crowdfunding
legislation has attempted to address such concerns by requiring that
certain disclosures, such as those identifying potential risks associated
with an issuer, be “concise and organized logically.”304
Even if the SEC’s efforts to reduce legalese and financial jargon
in financial disclosures were successful,305 few if any synonyms exist
for terms like “illiquidity”306 or “capital structure.”307 Moreover,
302. See generally Paredes, supra note 170, at 419 (arguing that more disclosure is
ineffective, creating “information overload” and causing people to adopt “simplifying
decision strategies that require less cognitive effort, but that are less accurate than more
complex decision strategies”).
303. See FINANCIAL LITERACY, supra note 301, at xi-xii.
304. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(f)(2)(h)(i) (2013) (requiring “a discussion of
significant factors that make the offering speculative or risky” to be “concise and
organized logically”).
305. The SEC has written a handbook, which explains that “[b]ecause many investors
are neither lawyers, accountants, nor investment bankers, we need to start writing
disclosure documents in a language investors can understand: plain English.” Arthur
Levitt, Introduction to SEC, OFFICE OF INV’R EDUC. & ASSISTANCE, A PLAIN ENGLISH
HANDBOOK: HOW TO CREATE CLEAR SEC DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS 3, 3 (1998).
Sixteen years after publication, it is unclear whether the handbook has effected any
changes in the industry. See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 283; FINANCIAL LITERACY,
supra note 301, at xiii (noting, in 2012, that many commenters continue to advocate for the
use of “plain language and common terminology”).
306. A thesaurus search yielded “no thesaurus results,” and instead, asked “[d]id you
mean algidity[?]” Illiquidity Synonyms, THESAURUS.COM, http://www.thesaurus.com
/browse/illiquidity?s=thttp://www.thesaurus.com/browse/illiquidity?s=t
[http://perma.cc
/D5ZQ-CBUX]. “Algidity” is a nominalization of the adjective “algid,” which means
“chill, cold[.]” Algid, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1961).
However, in its required portal disclaimer of risk, N.C. H.B. 680 described illiquidity in the
following terms:
THESE SECURITIES ARE SUBJECT TO RESTRICTIONS ON
TRANSFERABILITY AND RESALE AND MAY NOT BE TRANSFERRED
OR RESOLD EXCEPT AS PERMITTED BY SUBSECTION (E) OF SEC
RULE 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(E) AS PROMULGATED UNDER THE
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, AS AMENDED, AND THE APPLICABLE
STATE SECURITIES LAWS, PURSUANT TO REGISTRATION OR
EXEMPTION THEREFROM. INVESTORS SHOULD BE AWARE THAT
THEY WILL BE REQUIRED TO BEAR THE FINANCIAL RISKS OF THIS
INVESTMENT FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD OF TIME.
H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(7). The certification that each purchaser
must sign follows the disclaimer, requiring each buyer to acknowledge “[that] the
securities I am acquiring in this offering are illiquid, that there is no ready market for the
sale of such securities, that it may be difficult for me to sell or otherwise dispose of this
investment.” Id. sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(8)(c).
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financial and operational statements require at least an intermediate
level of mathematical competency.308 Disclosures that demand even
intermediate levels of mathematical competency may be ineffective at
informing “unsophisticated” investors, given that even lawyers are
notorious for struggling with math.309
Of course, navigating the legal and financial complexities
necessary to write disclosures regarding complex topics requires legal
or even financial expertise.310 Hence, disclosure language is still
subject to interpretation by legal and financial experts and the
accompanying
expert
biases
that
contribute
to
the
incomprehensibility of disclosures. Two examples of such biases,
among others, include “status quo [bias],” or the tendency to prefer
things to stay relatively the same,311 and “curse of knowledge” bias, an
inability to appreciate other perspectives, whether one’s own earlier
perspective or that of another.312 Status quo bias is embodied, for
example, in standard-form corporate charters and contracts in certain
307. No synonyms were identified on either Thesaurus.com or Investopedia.com. See
Capital Structure, THESAURUS.COM, http://ask.reference.com/web?s=t&q=capital%20structure
&l=dir&qsrc=2891&o=10300 [http://perma.cc/NJ79-7GDJ]; Capital Structure Definition,
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/capitalstructure.asp [http://perma.cc
/A79Q-TRBX] (defining capital structure as “[a] mix of a company’s long-term debt,
specific short-term debt, common equity and preferred equity . . . how a firm finances its
overall operations and growth by using different sources of funds”). Of course, one could
create a much simpler definition of capital structure, such as “the combination of debt and
equity used to finance a company,” but even such a relatively simple definition may
require explanation for the benefit of the retail investor. See Kenneth B. Firtel, Plain
English: A Reappraisal of the Intended Audience of Disclosure Under the Securities Act of
1933, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 851, 864–65 (1999). Even if one were to create an even simpler
definition, such as “the amount of money that a firm borrows, combined with the money it
uses from proceeds from shareholders, to finance its operations,” investors still need to
understand why a disclosure would be telling them this, and the consequences that flow
from a given capital structure. See id.
308. See, e.g., Stefan J. Padfield, Who Should Do the Math? Materiality Issues in
Disclosures That Require Investors To Calculate the Bottom Line, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 927,
943–44 (2007) (explaining how courts apply the general rule that failure to perform
mathematical calculations for investors is not a material omission).
309. See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Posner: Lawyers Bad at Math Are an Increasing
Concern; Inmates Blood-Pressure Suit Shows Why, A.B.A. J.: SCI. & TECH. L. (Oct. 29,
2013, 12:51 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/posner_math_block_lawyers_an
_increasing_concern_inmates_blood-pressure_suit/ [http://perma.cc/2HTP-Y4QF] (explaining
Judge Richard Posner’s agitation with “lawyers who explain that they picked law over a
technical field because they have a ‘math-block’ ”).
310. See KHADEMIAN, supra note 291, at 91.
311. See, e.g., William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision
Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 7 (1988) (“A series of decision-making experiments
shows that individuals disproportionately stick with the status quo.”).
312. See, e.g., Susan A.J. Birch & Paul Bloom, The Curse of Knowledge in Reasoning
About False Beliefs, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 382, 382 (2007).
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industries, which perpetuate themselves for years without change the
same clauses and contract language.313 While the ease and comfort of
using time-tested language simplifies the process of drafting,314 it
perpetuates disclosure incomprehensibility.315 Likewise, curse of
knowledge bias “make[s] it difficult for experts to bridge the gap
between themselves and novices because they have difficulty
imagining ever having been so ill-informed on the topic and
accurately imagining the information that novices might not know.”316
Accordingly, even where lawyers and accountants attempt to simplify
disclosures, curse of knowledge bias may stifle their awareness that
certain terms, clauses, or even general financial concepts are
unfamiliar to everyday people.
As such, some disclosure requirements under H.B. 680 would
likely have been more costly than effective, subjecting smaller issuers
to burdensome expenses and potentially unlimited liability, without
truly helping guide investors’ decisions. The revised exemption should
provide for either standardized disclosures where issuers can “fill-inthe-blank” or fill out disclosure tables, which provide a cost-effective
alternative—both of which increase disclosure comprehension among
investors.317 Among other requirements,318 H.B. 680 required issuers
to produce pre-offering disclosures that included the terms and
potential modifications to securities, the differences among classes of
securities, and the total percentage ownership of the company that
the offered securities represent.319 Further, like many other states’
crowdfunding laws, H.B. 680 required a “discussion of significant
factors that make [the crowdfunded] offering speculative or risky,”320
in addition to several mandated warnings of risk.321 Post-offering,

313. See Brian JM Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, Status Quo Bias, and Adoption of the
Exclusive Forum Provision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137, 178 (2011).
314. See id. at 177.
315. Pamela J. Hinds & Jeffrey Pfeffer, Why Organizations Don’t “Know What They
Know”: Cognitive and Motivational Factors Affecting the Transfer of Expertise, in
SHARING EXPERTISE: BEYOND KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 3, 7 (Mark S. Ackerman,
Volkmar Pipek & Volker Wulf eds., 2003).
316. Id.
317. See Wroldsen, supra note 287, at 629–31 (providing an example of a simple, easyto-understand disclosure table of venture capital deal terms).
318. See supra Section IV.A.3 (outlining disclosure requirements under H.B. 680).
319. See, e.g., H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(5)(b).
320. See id. sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(13); WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(f)(2)-i (2013).
321. See H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(7)–(8) (requiring a disclaimer
legend and investor certification that the investor understands the risks of an offering);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51-304 (LEXIS through 1st Reg. Sess. of the 70th Gen. Assemb.);
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-19-2-2(27)(H)–(I) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.);
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H.B. 680 required issuers to provide investors with quarterly financial
and operational reports.322
A new North Carolina crowdfunding exemption should retain
most of the “core” requirements of H.B. 680, such as disclosure of
issuer information, target offering amount, and the deadline to meet
the target.323 Additionally, the exemption should require limited
complex disclosure information, including details about capital
structure and investors’ terms and rights under crowdfunded
securities. The exemption should delineate specifically what
information should be disclosed under these requirements. Finally,
the discussion of significant factors that make a particular offering
risky, and information regarding the differences among classes of
securities should be omitted from the exemption.
3. The Benefits of Standardized Disclosures
Many of the shortcomings inherent in disclosure requirements
can be addressed by standardized disclosure forms. By providing for
standardized disclosure templates that are concise and logically
ordered, this proposal simplifies and improves on H.B. 680’s more
exhaustive disclosure requirements.324 Similarly, the regulations can
supplement and remedy disclosure shortcomings by mandating
website features like chat portals, which provide more effective
“organic” regulation, incentivize intermediaries to screen issuers, and
meet investor education requirements.
First, standardized disclosure templates will assist issuers with
the costs and complexity involved in producing disclosures, much like
the templates used for Regulation A offerings325 or the disclosure

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 451.2202a(1)(h) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Mich. Pub.
Acts 130); WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(h)(i).
322. H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(c).
323. See supra Section IV.A.3. Specifically, required disclosures should include
background information about the issuer, its business plan, the target offering amount and
deadline to reach the target, websites where the issuer’s securities will be offered, and any
pending litigation involving the issuer. See H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A17.1(a)(5).
324. See H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(5), (a)(13), (c).
325. In the Advocacy comment letter to the SEC regarding the proposed rules, it
requested that the SEC provide a simple “question and answer” format for nonfinancial
disclosures, such as that used for Regulation A offerings, or boilerplate disclosures for
more complicated nonfinancial disclosures. Sargeant Letter, supra note 226, at 4. See
generally Regulation A Offering Statement, Form 1-A, 17 C.F.R. § 239.90 (2015)
(providing a “question and answer” format for information about the offering and tables
for declaring information regarding both outstanding securities and the identities of
directors, executive officers, and significant employees).
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tables suggested by one commentator.326 Such disclosure tables would
consist of a column that includes specific securities terms, followed by
a column modified to match each relevant term.327 Templates would
provide a free checklist to help issuers navigate financial- and legaldisclosure requirements. Specifically, templates would lay out the
relevant disclosure provisions for issuers, similar to a manual that
would guide them in identifying what information to disclose.
Moreover, standardized disclosure templates would remove the
burden of drafting disclosures de novo, thus substantially reducing or
even eliminating costs to attain legal and financial expertise.328
Standardized disclosures also benefit investors. By prescribing a
concise and logically organized standard template, regulators can
ensure that the disclosures are readable, preventing attorneys from
masking unsavory terms in legalese or otherwise burying information
in an unorganized and complex document.329 Further, such
standardized disclosures serve to mitigate status-quo and curse-ofknowledge biases by channeling and simplifying drafting efforts by
attorneys.330
Standardized disclosures would become more transparent still
when coupled with investor education materials.331 These disclosures
would allow investors to locate specific provisions necessary to
compare investment opportunities. Investors need only learn once
where to look for each relevant provision, rather than taking the time
to learn the format of each company’s proprietary disclosures.332
More importantly, investor education would help ensure that
investors understand the disclosures.333 This is especially important
when applied to more complex information, discussed in the next
section.

326. See Wroldsen, supra note 287, at 629–31 (providing an example of a simple, easyto-understand disclosure table of venture capital deal terms).
327. See id.
328. Cf. KHADEMIAN, supra note 291, at 91 (stating that federal securities laws and
SEC policies force corporations, investment bankers, brokerage houses, etc. to rely on
securities lawyers to ensure compliance).
329. See Firtel, supra note 307, at 875 (explaining SEC’s efforts via plain English to
address dense boilerplate and obfuscation that “discouraged investors from reading the
disclosure documents” or even rendered it “virtually impossible for investors to extract the
significant information” from disclosures).
330. See supra notes 305–16 and accompanying text.
331. See infra Section VI.E.
332. See Wroldsen, supra note 287, at 626.
333. See infra Section VI.E.
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4. Required Disclosure of Limited Complex Information
A successful crowdfunding exemption must strike a balance,
effecting sufficient investor protection without overburdening small
businesses and risky startups with excessive regulation and disclosure
requirements. Minimal pre-offering disclosure requirements provided
in some states’ crowdfunding exemptions offer simplicity and costreduction, but they neglect one piece of the crowdfunding puzzle:
investor protection.334 Thus, certain complex matters, including a
description of the company’s capital structure and the terms and
potential modifications to securities, should be provided in preoffering disclosures.335 Providing this information is important to
ensure that investors know what they are getting when purchasing
crowdfunded securities; ensure that investors may properly compare
investment opportunities; and avoid chilling investment in
crowdfunded companies.
First, general statements of risk and communication features on
funding portals that convey qualitative information should be
substituted in place of a “discussion of significant factors that make
the offering speculative or risky.”336 Second, contrary to H.B. 680’s
requirement,337 quarterly reports should only be required once the
issuer reaches a specified benchmark, not immediately after it
completes its first offering.
Third, information regarding capital structure and terms of
securities338 should be limited to clear, basic information. Capital
structure, or the mix of debt and equity a firm uses to finance its
operations,339 is material to assessing a firm’s risk, and thus material to
any investment decision. In particular, highly leveraged firms are
generally riskier than well-capitalized firms.340 Higher debt may also
334. See ALA. CODE § 8-6-11(a)(14)(c) (West, Westlaw through Act 2015-520)
(permitting satisfaction of disclosure requirements when disclosure is made
“simultaneously with the execution by the purchaser of a written agreement”); GA. COMP.
R. & REGS. 590-4-2.08(1)(f) (West, Westlaw through July 31, 2015) (requiring the names
and addresses of those involved in the issuance but not quarterly financial reports); KAN.
ADMIN. REGS. § 81-5-21(a) (2013) (requiring only the names and addresses of the issuer,
all persons involved in the offer, the bank or institution in which the funds will be
deposited, and no quarterly financial reports).
335. See H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(5).
336. Id. sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(13).
337. Id. sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(c).
338. See THE ACCOUNTANT’S HANDBOOK § 4.8(b)(v) (Lynford Graham ed., 2012),
LexisNexis.
339. See Capital Structure, supra note 307.
340. See TOBIAS ADRIAN & NINA BOYARCHENKO, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y.,
INTERMEDIARY LEVERAGE CYCLES AND FINANCIAL STABILITY 1–2 (2012), http://www
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afford investors a higher risk premium, and hence a higher expected
return.341 Vice-versa, investors can identify safer assets by looking for
firms with little or no debt.342 Young, small businesses may not have
revenue streams sufficient to justify hiring a finance executive, many
of whom command six-figure salaries for managing a firm’s capital
structure and accounting practices and controls.343 Whether a firm has
a finance executive or not, someone in the business must be charged
with managing the business’s finances, especially its capital
structure.344
Moreover, the allocation of total debt and equity set out in a
balance sheet should reveal an issuer’s capital structure.345
Standardized disclosures or disclosure tables, where firms can simply
check a box or fill in a blank, can make it even easier for firms to
identify this information while ensuring that material information is
available to investors.346 Firms that cannot identify their own
fundamental financial metrics, especially with manageable
standardized disclosures, should raise a red flag for investors.
Investors may well associate financial incompetence with likelihood
of failure, filtering out potentially unsuccessful firms and further
improving the crowdfunding market.347
.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr567.pdf [http://perma.cc/S54V-NU4H].
The
financial crisis provides perhaps the best illustration of the risks inherent in using too much
leverage. For example, by March 2008, when Bear Stearns had “a leverage ratio of more
than 35-to-1, even a small loss of only 3.2 percent of the assets would obliterate stockholder
equity.” Troy S. Brown, Legal Political Moral Hazard: Does the Dodd-Frank Act End Too
Big To Fail?, 3 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV., no. 1, 2012, at 1, 32.
341. See, e.g., ADRIAN & BOYARCHENKO, supra note 340, at 26 (describing the
relationship between the risk of financial distress and the price of risk).
342. See, e.g., RAYMOND J. LUCIA & DALE FEATHERLING, READY . . . SET . . .
RETIRE! FINANCIAL STRATEGIES FOR THE REST OF YOUR LIFE 111 (2007) (explaining
that real estate investment trusts with little or no debt are safer but generally offer lower
returns).
343. See, e.g., Darren Dahl, When Should a Small Business Hire a Finance Chief, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/27/business/smallbusiness/whenshould-a-small-business-hire-a-chief-financial-officer.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [http://perma
.cc/4CBJ-QCFD (dark archive)] (emphasizing that a small business should hire a financial
executive as soon as it “can afford one”).
344. See id. (explaining that when the necessity of obtaining business capital causes a
firm’s CEO to be “distracted from critical revenue-generating activities[,]” it is time to
hire a CFO).
345. See Jeff Partnoy & Lynn Turner, Bring Transparency to Off-Balance Sheet Accounting,
in MAKE MARKETS BE MARKETS 85, 85–86 (2009), http://www.makemarketsbemarkets
.org/report/MakeMarketsBeMarkets.pdf [http://perma.cc/BF3G-CL32].
346. See Wroldsen, supra note 287, at 628–32.
347. See Jill Hamburg Coplan, Raising Capital: Equity vs. Debt, BLOOMBERG BUS.
(Dec. 4, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/magazine/content/09_72/s0912030511552
.htm [http://perma.cc/3ZJT-GVS9] (“Running your business without knowing your
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Fourth, investors need to know what they are getting into.
Knowing the terms and rights available under investors’ crowdfunded
securities better informs valuation judgments and comparisons with
other investments.348 If issuers are not charged with identifying the
terms and rights associated with their securities, issuers could make
up this information as they go along, to investors’ detriment. Without
knowing the convertibility of a stock, for example, investors may
enter into a securities transaction unaware that the stocks they had
bargained for could be converted to debt with lower returns, no
voting rights, and without a proper conversion discount.349 Moreover,
investors cannot enforce rights that they are unaware of or that do
not exist.350
Fifth, reduced transparency can mislead investors. For example,
abusive off-balance-sheet accounting351 partially contributed to the
financial crisis by triggering “a daisy chain of dysfunctional decisionmaking by removing transparency from investors, markets, and
regulators.”352 Notably, institutional investors prefer to invest in firms
that produce higher-quality disclosures.353 Scant disclosure may chill
investment in crowdfunded companies by scaring off investors
unwilling to take blind risks.
However, excessive disclosure may upset the balance between
investor protection and costs to small businesses where certain
information adds little value and contributes to information

numbers is like driving a car without being able to see your direction or speed . . . . It’s only
a matter of time before you crash.”).
348. See William W. Barker, Outside Bucks, BUS. L. TODAY, July/Aug. 2000, at 15–16
(explaining that documentation in private financings should include information about
investors’ rights).
349. See Convertible Securities, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/convertibles.htm
[http://perma.cc/FVA8-TUYU] (identifying characteristics of certain convertible securities).
350. See Ira M. Millstein, Non-Traditional Modes of Enforcement, in ENFORCEMENT
AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THREE VIEWS 1, 3 (2005), http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm
/connect/6ab71c8048a7e7b3accfef6060ad5911/Focus_ENFCorpGov3.pdf?MOD=AJPERES
[http://perma.cc/M4JK-GE5D] (“Why would any sensible investor invest if investor rights
either didn’t exist, or could not be enforced?”).
351. Off-balance-sheet items, including financial derivatives, are items for which a firm
does not have legal claim or responsibility. Off Balance Sheet—OBS, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/off-balance-sheet-obs.asp [http://perma.cc/K7H4-DBU7]
(“Off balance sheet items are of particular interest to investors trying to determine the
financial health of a company. These items are harder to track, and can become hidden
liabilities. Collateralized debt obligations, for instance, may become a toxic asset before
investors realize a company’s exposure.”).
352. Partnoy & Turner, supra note 345, at 85.
353. See Brian J. Bushee & Christopher F. Noe, Corporate Disclosure Practices,
Institutional Investors, and Stock Return Volatility, 38 J. ACCT. RES. 171, 172 (2000).
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overload.354 Specifically, issuers undertaking an unnecessarily
exhaustive analysis about differences among classes of securities and
how other classes of securities may affect the rights of crowdfunded
securities would surely require the expensive employment of financial
and legal professionals.355 Investors must be charged with some
diligence in making investment decisions. It should be enough that
investors can ascertain this information themselves by reviewing an
issuer’s financial statements—especially simplified disclosures—which
is what such disclosures were intended for.356
Sixth, quarterly reports, as noted above, should only be required
if: (1) the issuer reaches a certain financial benchmark, such as
operating cash flow; (2) the issuer solicits a second crowdfunded
offering; or (3) resale restrictions are maintained after the restriction
period. A benchmark is wise because, if the issuer has not achieved a
requisite level of cash flow or operating history, it likely has not
experienced the level of growth necessary to make periodic disclosure
meaningful.357 A second offering may indicate an issuer’s need for
further capital to sustain such growth. Moreover, the burdensome
costs of periodic disclosures echo those of audited financials and
other complex disclosures that require financial or legal expertise.
Accordingly, producing periodic disclosures shortly after an offering
may consume an issuer’s crowdfunding proceeds, which could be
better applied elsewhere.358
Of course, some of the information contained in the proposed
disclosure requirements will not be immediately comprehensible to
all investors. Especially if standardized disclosures are implemented,
investor education requirements could be used to guide investors in
navigating disclosure statements, thus helping to enhance investor
protection.

354. See supra Sections IV.D.2–3.
355. See KHADEMIAN, supra note 291, at 91.
356. In fact, there are easily accessible resources instructing prospective investors how to
determine capital structure from financial statements. See, e.g., Hans Wagner, Analyzing a
Bank’s Financial Statements, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/stocks/07
/bankfinancials.asp [http://perma.cc/XV8X-29LF] (providing a crash course in financial
statement analysis); see also Financial Statement Analysis, ACCOUNTINGTOOLS, http://www
.accountingtools.com/financial-statement-analysis [http://perma.cc/7J48-XNV6].
357. See supra notes 283–96 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 217–30 and accompanying text.
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Investor Education

A new North Carolina crowdfunding exemption should follow
the lead of other states and organizations359 by including investor
education requirements. Educational requirements provide an
additional safeguard to limit investor losses, increase investor
comprehension, and help issuers to “positively affirm” that investors
understand the risks inherent in equity crowdfunding.360 Investor
education materials should be provided by the applicable state
regulator,361 limited to relatively basic financial concepts, written in
“plain English,”362 logically organized and concise, and constructed to
supplement standardized disclosures. Investors should review a brief
presentation, video, or reading materials. Then, investors should be
required to pass a test or quiz before they may begin using a funding
portal, to ensure that they have successfully used and understood the
educational materials. All such educational materials and quizzes
could easily be provided online.
The applicable state regulator, rather than the intermediaries,
should provide investor education materials to ensure uniformity,
limit intermediaries’ ability to withhold adverse information, and
reduce regulatory uncertainty surrounding potentially ambiguous or
unclear curricula. Additional the provision of such materials would
limit intermediary liability in the event of loss and ensure that all
investors receive the same education, no matter which portal they

359. Other states and organizations have recognized the importance of investor education
and have already begun introducing public and private educational materials to assist investors
and issuers. See, e.g., Crowdfunding Professional Association Launches New Global Crowdfund
Investing Education Network, PR NEWSWIRE (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.prnewswire.com/news
-releases/crowdfunding-professional-association-launches-new-global-crowdfund-investingeducation-network-192244731.html [http://perma.cc/E9TM-M43W]; Georgia Crowdfunding
Community, MEETUP, http://www.meetup.com/Georgia-Crowdfunding/ [http://perma.cc/2DXZ
-T24D] (providing a platform for crowdfunding participants in Georgia to meet, share
experiences, and educate their community on different types of equity and debt-based
crowdfunding); Information for Prospective Investors, TEX. ST. SEC. BOARD, http://www.ssb
.state.tx.us/Important_Notice/Information_for_Investors.php (last modified Nov. 7, 2014) [http:
//perma.cc/WS63-674N] (informing prospective investors about crowdfunding and providing
guidance on deciphering certain disclosures); Informed Investor Advisory: Crowdfunding,
NASAA, http://www.nasaa.org/12842/informed-investor-advisory-crowdfunding/ [http://perma
.cc/HJ7F-63MM].
360. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,470 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249).
361. In North Carolina, the securities regulator would likely be the Securities Division
of the Department of the Secretary of State. See North Carolina Securities Division
Homepage, N.C. DEP’T SECRETARY ST., http://www.secretary.state.nc.us/sec/ [http://perma
.cc/S6XY-FHVZ].
362. See, e.g., supra notes 305 and 329 and accompanying text.
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use. Then, intermediaries should be free to expand educational
requirements, considering their unique businesses and investor
bases.363
These educational materials need not be exhaustive. Rather, they
should apprise investors of the general risks and responsibilities of
investing in crowdfunded securities, including, but not limited to
instructing investors how to locate specific, basic information
contained in pre-offering disclosures; helping investors understand
certain disclosure terms; advising investors on the risks associated
with startups and small businesses; and educating investors about
crowdfunding regulations.
There are several practical considerations that weigh against
attempting to educate retail investors about more complex concepts.
First, given the prolific financial incompetence among retail
investors,364 educational materials serve only to bring investors up to
speed on core concepts. Facing intimidating or complex concepts,
unsophisticated investors may be discouraged from participating in
crowdfunding. Moreover, test-passage rates may suffer, diminishing
the crowdfunding exemption’s utility as an alternative capital-raising
mechanism.365 In any case, most investors are unlikely to apply
complex concepts when making their investment decisions.366
Educational materials increase the user-friendliness of standardized
disclosures, thus encouraging the examination of disclosures by
investors. Educational materials could direct investors to information
contained in standardized disclosures relevant to compare investment
opportunities.367

363. See, e.g., Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,470.
364. See, e.g., FINANCIAL LITERACY, supra note 301, at vii-viii (“[S]tudies have found
that investors do not understand the most elementary financial concepts, such as
compound interest and inflation.”).
365. Cf. id.; Walter Hamilton, Millions of Americans Lack Basic Financial Literacy,
Studies Show, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/27/business
/la-fi-financial-literacy-20131228 [http://perma.cc/Z6WU-NHAL] (suggesting that prolific
financial illiteracy should be met with simpler financial products, rather than, or in
addition to, financial education).
366. See FINANCIAL LITERACY, supra note 301, at vii-viii. Likewise, a recent survey
revealed that an overwhelming amount of potential investors chose not to invest, fearing
“talk[ing] to anyone about their money, and that’s partly because they seem[ed] to fear
looking stupid or revealing how little they [knew] about investing.” Kimberly Palmer, Why
Millennials Are Scared To Invest, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 31, 2014, 8:50 AM), http://money
.usnews.com/money/blogs/alpha-consumer/2014/10/31/why-millennials-are-scared-toinvest [http://perma.cc/7SN7-RF3R].
367. See Wroldsen, supra note 287, at 630 (providing an example of a simple, easy-tounderstand disclosure table of venture capital deal terms).
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Educational requirements also address some of the major
shortcomings of required disclosures. First, disclosures do not ensure
that investors read or understand them,368 only that the information is
put in front of the investors, similar to “clickwrap” agreements369 that
buyers rarely read.370 Conditioning access to the portal on the passage
of a test is a sound, functional way to ensure that educational
materials are read and understood.
However, requiring the state to produce and promulgate investor
education materials will result in additional costs to taxpayers—a
significant political hurdle and a drawback when compared to H.B.
680’s lack of any such requirement beyond investor self-certification
that the investor understands the relevant risks of crowdfunded
securities.371 To mitigate these concerns, the applicable state regulator
could assess fees from intermediaries at a reasonable rate to cover the
costs of providing educational materials. Additionally, cost-savings
from reduced and standardized disclosure requirements would help
balance any minimal assessment imposed by the state.
Further, North Carolina could simply provide a curriculum and
final quiz that investors must pass, rather than furnishing the investor
educational materials. Intermediaries would then produce compliant
educational materials at their own expense. Such a requirement
would also empower the intermediary, who is most familiar with its
business and investor base,372 to tailor its educational materials to its
target audience of investors. Moreover, it would prevent
intermediaries from undermining investor-education requirements. If
educational materials are inadequate, investors would fail the
required quiz, reducing investment via the funding portal.

368. See supra Section VI.D.2.
369. “A ‘clickwrap’ agreement appears when a user first installs computer software
obtained from an online source or attempts to conduct an Internet transaction involving
the agreement, and purports to condition further access to the software or transaction on
the user’s consent to certain conditions there specified; the user ‘consents’ to these
conditions by ‘clicking’ on a dialog box on the screen, which then proceeds with the
remainder of the software installation or Internet transaction.” Kevin W. Grierson,
Enforceability of “Clickwrap” or “Shrinkwrap” Agreements Common in Computer
Software, Hardware, and Internet Transactions, 106 A.L.R.5th 309, 317 n.1 (2003).
370. See Susan E. Gindin, Nobody Reads Your Privacy Policy or Online Contract?
Lessons Learned and Questions Raised by the FTC’s Action Against Sears, 8 NW. J. TECH.
& INTELL. PROP. 1, 14 (2009).
371. H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(8).
372. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,471 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249).
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Alternatively, the state may consider borrowing educational materials
that are already being produced by other entities.373
By following this proposal, intermediaries would essentially be
regulated by market incentives as they compete to attract investors.
The next section provides a comprehensive discussion of this
intermediary regulation beyond educational requirements.
F.

Intermediary Regulation

Wisely, H.B. 680 did not burden intermediaries with excessive
regulation, but rather elected to stimulate market competition.374
Intermediaries should largely be governed by competitive market
incentives to: combat fraud, feature quality companies, offer valueadded services to assist issuers, and provide funding portal features to
assist both issuers and investors.
Promoting competition among intermediaries is essential to a
successful crowdfunding exemption.375 Competition can mitigate the
shortcomings of both ineffective and reduced disclosure
requirements. First, intermediaries’ and issuers’ interests are normally
aligned376—attracting investors is fundamental to both parties’
success. The more investors that an issuer attracts, the more likely the
issuer’s crowdfunded offering will be successful. Likewise, since
intermediaries will profit from fees equal to a percentage of the funds
raised by its issuers’ crowdfunded offerings, intermediaries are
incentivized to feature successful issuers that attract more investors.377
373. The North American Securities Administrators Association (“NASAA”) already
has helpful crowdfunding and related investor educational materials on its website.
Investor Education, NASAA, http://www.nasaa.org/investor-education/ [http://perma.cc
/9UM8-9LQH]; see also supra note 359 and accompanying text.
374. H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(9)–(11).
375. See The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, SEC, http:// www.sec.gov/about
/laws.shtml [http://perma.cc/9SWW-NRBK]; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2006) (requiring
the SEC to consider “whether an action is . . . in the public interest, . . . [for] the protection
of investors, [and] whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital
formation”); Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. 215, 215 (2012), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 app. at 103–04 (2014) (directing executive agencies to reevaluate existing rules while
maintaining a regulatory system that promotes “economic growth, innovation,
competitiveness, and job creation”).
376. Abnormal circumstances might include fraud.
377. For example, according to a 2013 study, Kickstarter had over 110,000 campaigns,
raising an aggregate of $612 million, with forty projects that raised over $1 million and a
total campaign success rate of 44%. By comparison, Indiegogo had only 44,000 campaigns,
raising an aggregate total of $44 million, with only four projects that raised over $1 million
and a total campaign success rate below 34%. Jonathan Lau, Dollar for Dollar Raised,
Kickstarter Dominates Indiegogo SIX Times Over, MEDIUM.COM (Aug. 28, 2013),
https://medium.com/@jonchiehlau/dollar-for-dollar-raised-kickstarter-dominatesindiegogo-six-times-over-2a48bc6ffd57 [http://perma.cc/U7TE-B5S4]. The study attributed
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Moreover, intermediaries will earn reputational goodwill by featuring
the best companies. If intermediaries feature low-performing
companies or companies that tend to fail, investor goodwill and
patronage will diminish. Issuers will avoid sites that fail to generate
sufficient investor traffic, where funding prospects are gloomy.
Hence, success begets success—issuers’ natural attraction to
successful intermediaries will improve the quality of companies that
intermediaries feature on their websites.
As a result, intermediaries have strong market incentives to
rigorously screen the companies they feature. Recognizing that fraud
is bad for business,378 this practice may account for some of ASSOB’s
success.379 Specifically, revelation of fraud within a particular funding
portal may stymie investment in that portal.380 To avoid stigma
associated with a defrauded funding portal, issuers may choose
alternative portals to showcase their startups.
Moreover, intermediaries may compete by offering premium
services to their issuers, increasing the likelihood of issuer success.
Intermediaries can increase their marketability by providing
professional services and templates to assist issuers in navigating the

Kickstarter’s success to the quality of companies it offers. Id. Indeed, the two competitors
have different funding models: “Indiegogo accepts anybody. Kickstarter does not.
Indiegogo gives campaigns the option of keeping all of the money if they miss their goal.
Kickstarter does not.” David Holmes, Infographic: Kickstarter vs Indiegogo, PANDODAILY
(Oct. 14, 2013), http://pando.com/2013/10/14/infographic-kickstarter-vs-indiegogo/ [http://perma
.cc/SQY2-J4XY].
378. See, e.g., Howard M. Rossen & Howard H. Fairweather, Damages in Fraud
Actions, 13 CLEV. MARSHALL L. REV. 288, 289 (1964) (noting that tort law recognizes
damages in actions for fraud for injury to a plaintiff’s business reputation); Richard I.
Werder, Jr. & John M. Newman, Jr., Rico [sic.] as a Vehicle for Intracorporate Claims by
Nontarget “Perpetrator” Corporations, 46 BUS. LAW. 1391, 1392 (1991) (explaining that
RICO actions against officers and directors are increasingly made by shareholders when
the company itself defrauded a third-party, resulting in damage to its business reputation
or a reduction in its stock value).
379. Many intermediaries operating in Australia use finance and investment
professionals to complete screening and curation of prospective crowdfunding candidates.
See Swart, supra note 193. Correlated or not, more than eighty percent of the firms
financed through ASSOB are still functioning. Id. Compare this with the success rate of
new American firms, half of which are still in existence after five years. See Frequently
Asked Questions, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/sbfaq.pdf
[http://perma.cc/595V-YGU3].
380. Cf., Qingbo Yuan & Yunyan Zhang, The Real Effects of Corporate Fraud:
Evidence from Class Action Lawsuits, J. ACCT. & FIN. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 4)
(Oct. 6, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2459279 [http://perma
.cc/VP87-TBYE] (finding that “total external financing significantly decreases after
corporate fraud revelation”).
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crowdfunding process,381 and even lobby and communicate with
regulators to improve the crowdfunding environment.382
A new crowdfunding exemption can take advantage of these
market based incentives with at least two additional intermediary
regulations that would enhance investor protection without
compromising competition: (1) providing for mandated chat features
on intermediary funding portals; and (2) requiring intermediaries to
have “skin-in-the-game” by requiring them to absorb some loss in the
event of fraud. At a minimum, to ensure a comprehensive regulatory
regime, intermediaries should be required to provide a “community”
or “crowd” chat feature on their portals.383 Interactive portals provide
a valuable tool by facilitating feedback, dialogue, and questions from
the crowd, which produce richer qualitative information.384
Crowdfunding portals will facilitate open communication between
investors, potential customers, and entrepreneurs, allowing the three
groups to align their interests. Issuers receive “free, crowdsourcedbrainstorming,”385 benefitting from customer feedback before
spending substantial sums on production. Issuers can then apply the
information provided by investors and customers to perfect their
businesses, to field questions, and to proactively address customer
needs before entering the market, ultimately improving the likelihood
of issuer success.386
Interactive crowdfunding portals also align nicely with
crowdfunding’s accelerated development cycle, giving issuers
incentive to respond to investor concerns as they promote, test, and if
381. The ASSOB requires issuers to choose a “sponsor” that provides these services. See
ASSOB: Australia’s Largest Capital Raising Platform for Growing, Unlisted Companies,
CROWD CAFE, http://www.thecrowdcafe.com/platform/assob/ [http://perma.cc/C6YC-XJBP].
382. Indeed, intermediaries operating within ASSOB have “helped shape the equity
raising landscaping in Australia by lobbying and engaging regulators to build an
environment that allows for capital raising in a controlled yet not onerous environment.”
See Crowd Funding—Lessons Learned in 8 Years of Equity Crowd Funding, supra note
190.
383. In its proposed rules, the SEC required intermediaries to provide such a feature.
See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,430 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, and 249).
384. See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Investor and Market Protection in the
Crowdfunding Era: Disclosing to and for the “Crowd”, 38 VT. L. REV. 827, 846 (2014)
(discussing the “richer, but more dynamic disclosure environment in which investors, as
well as issuers and intermediaries” contribute to the mix of available information).
385. The Benefits of Crowdfunding, FUNDABLE, https://www.fundable.com/learn
/resources/guides/crowdfunding-guide/the-benefits-of-crowdfunding [http://perma.cc/464H
-EUUP].
386. See, e.g., Greenstein, supra note 165 (discussing a recent study that found focusing
too much on the product and not enough on customers was a main contributor to startup
failure).
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necessary, discard their ideas.387 Thus, issuers are incentivized to
respond to investor concerns. Investors can satisfy their concerns by
providing tailored advice or asking questions that disclosures do not
answer. Moreover, the crowd will be composed of investors of various
levels of sophistication and expertise.388 Investors will, as always, have
different expectations and goals.389 Nontraditional investors will
benefit from access to knowledge conveyed by sophisticated
investors.390 Hence, communication portals enable the crowd to
inform itself.
Furthermore, while intermediaries cannot entirely prevent
business failures or economically driven investor losses, they can, with
the help of smart regulations, prevent fraud and create a safer
crowdfunding experience for investors.391 First, a new North Carolina
exemption should retain H.B. 680’s requirement that intermediaries
avoid conflicts of interest.392 But this, alone, is not enough, and so
intermediaries should be required to have some “skin in the game,”393
absorbing at least 15% to 25% of investor losses in the event of fraud.
This offers two benefits. First, it provides fraud insurance to help
387. See Leonhardt, supra note 166 (“New ideas will be free market tested earlier in
their development cycle and discarded or funded at a faster rate. The old innovators
mantra of try a lot of stuff and keep what works will be applied at hyper speed rates.”).
388. See Heminway, supra note 384, at 831 n.15 (“Crowdfunding . . . . draws its
maximum power when the collective diversity is the greatest.” (quoting KEVIN LAWTON
& DAN MAROM, THE CROWDFUNDING REVOLUTION: HOW TO RAISE VENTURE
CAPITAL USING SOCIAL MEDIA 181 (2013))).
389. Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair
Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 1238 (1990) (arguing that the Capital Asset
Pricing Model does not take into account that investors have different expectations, and
thus value securities differently).
390. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,531 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, and 249) (“[I]t is likely that investors and interested
participants would provide relevant adverse information about an issuer or an offering
through postings on chat sites, message boards, and other communication channels,
including, but not limited to, the communication channels to be provided by the
intermediary.”).
391. See Hazen, supra note 179, at 1754; cf. supra Section V.B.
392. See H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(11)-(12).
393. A similar provision is found in the Dodd-Frank Act. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 941(d), 124 Stat. 1376, 1893–
94 (amending the Securities Exchange Act at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) et seq. (2010)). While that
rule applies to originators and mortgage lenders, and thus carries its own unintended
consequences, see Chris Arnold, Forcing Banks To Put More ‘Skin in the Game’, NPR
(June 18, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=105558991
[http://perma.cc/QJ5D-HNNE]. Such a provision is more beneficial here, insofar as it gives
intermediaries an incentive to screen issuers and prevent fraud. Cf. id.; Floyd Norris,
Banks Again Avoid Having Any Skin in the Game, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www
.nytimes.com/2014/10/24/business/banks-again-avoid-having-any-skin-in-the-game.html
[http://perma.cc/LD4W-3S2Q (dark archive)].
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moderate investor losses. Second, it incentivizes intermediaries to
diligently screen and monitor issuers both before and after featuring
issuers on their websites. Of course, an intermediary may still recover
by seeking subrogation394 from a fraudulent issuer.
Intermediaries will play a tremendous role in any crowdfunding
environment. In addition to intermediaries’ roles of connecting
investors to entrepreneurs, intermediaries may also play an integral
role as the brokers of a secondary market if resale restrictions are
lifted.
G. Resale Restrictions
A new North Carolina crowdfunding exemption should loosen
H.B. 680’s resale restriction, which would have prohibited investors
from selling or transferring securities for a certain period after
issuance.395 A new exemption should permit issuers to establish a
limited, intrastate, interportal secondary market for crowdfunded
securities.
Despite the shortcomings inherent in resale restrictions,
commentators have suggested two potential benefits associated with
them. First, a resale restriction may serve to protect secondary market
investors, who do not have direct access to the information on the
crowdfunding portal, from fraud.396 Second, it affords investors a
period “to observe the performance of the business” and gather
information about its economic prospects “before trading occurs.”397
This proposal reflects the views of critics of resale restrictions398
who assert that the consequences of the resale restriction outweigh its

394. For purposes of this Comment, subrogation refers to the right of the intermediary,
after compensating investors for losses resulting from fraud, to pursue the third-party
fraudster in an action to recover those losses. See, e.g., Subrogation, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/subrogation.asp [http://perma.cc/M46Y-6DL6].
395. See H.B. 680, supra note 14, sec. 2, § 78A-17.1(a)(7).
396. Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril:
Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 954 (2011).
397. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,526 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, and 249).
398. See Bradford, supra note 48, at 144–45 (explaining that investors unaware of such
restrictions may be exposed to liability and that issuers could lose their exemptions if
resale restrictions are “given any teeth”); Sherief Morsy, Note, The JOBS Act and
Crowdfunding: How Narrowing the Secondary Market Handicaps Fraud Plaintiffs, 79
BROOK. L. REV. 1373, 1393–99 (2014) (arguing that resale restrictions limit private
securities fraud remedies). The SEC has explained that its proposed one-year resale
restriction could “reduce trading liquidity, raise capital costs to issuers and limit investor
participation, particularly for investors who cannot risk locking up their investments for
this period.” Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,526.
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potential benefits.399 Specifically, resale restrictions have four negative
consequences, some of which have been identified by the SEC in its
own proposed rules.400 First, a resale restriction will render
crowdfunded securities illiquid, which would effectively tie up
investor capital in their crowdfunded securities, preventing investors
from cashing out, even if they wanted to.401 Valuation will be difficult
without a market to determine prices. Second, investors will require
higher returns resulting from the higher liquidity premiums attributed
to illiquid crowdfunded securities, thus raising capital costs to
issuers.402 Third, the resale restriction will “limit investor
participation, particularly for investors who cannot risk locking up
their investments for this period.”403 Finally, the resale restriction will
limit private securities fraud remedies available to investors.404
Securities fraud and civil liability provisions of Securities Act
section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5 apply to crowdfunding
transactions.405 Additionally, a new provision, section 4A(c) of the
Securities Act,406 furnishes to crowdfunding investors in offerings
made under Title III of the JOBS Act the remedies available under
section 12(a),407 which provides for liability if the issuer in the offer or
sale of the securities “makes an untrue statement [or omission] of a
material fact.”408 An investor that brings a successful action pursuant
399. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,526. The SEC further explained that the
“illiquidity cost would be mitigated, in part, by provisions that allow investors to transfer
the securities” during the resale restriction period in limited circumstances. Id. Those
included “reselling the securities to accredited investors, back to the issuer or in a
registered offering or transferring them to certain family members or trusts of those family
members. These provisions likely would improve the liquidity of these securities and, thus,
could increase investor participation in securities-based crowdfunding offerings.” Id.
400. See id.
401. See id. (“The restrictions on resales, however, may impede price discovery.”).
402. See generally, Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Liquidity, the Value of the
Firm, and Corporate Finance, 2 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 17, 32 (2008) (arguing that a
company’s “liquidity risk” is an important factor affecting the company’s value).
403. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,526.
404. For a more thorough discussion on the limitations of private securities remedies
under a crowdfunded securities resale restriction, see generally Morsy, supra note 398
(describing how a resale restriction would harm plaintiffs in a crowdfunded securities
fraud case).
405. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act prohibit fraud and misstatements in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (2013); see also Hazen, supra note 179, at 1769 (noting that, in addition to civil
liability provisions, “mandated disclosures” are another form of “investor protection”).
406. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(c)(1)(B) (2013) (“An action brought under [§ 77d-1] shall be
subject to the provisions of section 77l(b) of this title and section 77m of this title, as if the
liability were created under section [12] of [the Securities Act].”).
407. § 77d(a)(2).
408. See § 77d-1(c)(2)(A).
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to section 4A(c) may recover the price paid for the security, or
damages if the investor has already sold the security.409 However, as
under sections 12(b) and 13 and Rule 10b-5, the plaintiff must prove
“loss causation.”410 That is, damages are limited to loss of the
security’s value that result from material misstatements or
omissions.411 But without a secondary market to provide price
information412 an investor will find it difficult to prove loss
causation.413 In any case, if a plaintiff cannot sell his shares in
response to a misstatement or omission, the result under a resale
restriction is no harm, no foul.414
Nonetheless, intrastate crowdfunding exemptions, as opposed to
the federal exemption, are only available under section 3(a) of the
Securities Act, which requires all investors to reside in the state where
securities are issued.415 Thus, a secondary market option faces an
obstacle where investors in the issuer’s state could circumvent the
exemption by purchasing and then reselling crowdfunded securities to
nonresidents of the issuer’s state. The secondary–market maker416
would have to certify that crowdfunded securities purchased on its
exchange are purchased by state residents.

409. See § 77d-1(c)(1)(A).
410. See, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345–46 (2005) (holding that a
plaintiff in a Rule 10b-5 action must establish a causal connection between the fraudulent
transaction and the resulting damages).
411. 4 THOMAS L. HAZEN, LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.11(3) (6th ed.
2009).
412. See SEC Proposes Rules To Implement Crowdfunding Exemption: What Factors
Will Affect Its Success?, GIBSON DUNN (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.gibsondunn.com
/publications/pages/SEC-Proposes-Rules-to-Implement-Crowdfunding-Exemption-WhatFactors-Will-Affect-Its-Success.aspx [http://perma.cc/QRP8-AG2Y].
413. See Erica P. John Fund v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2187 (2011) (“As we
have explained, loss causation is a familiar and distinct concept in securities law; it is not
price impact.”); Morsy, supra note 398, at 1404.
414. Morsy, supra note 398, at 1398 (“[W]hen the [material misstatement] was made, if
the plaintiff could not sell his shares, how could the statement have been said to damage
the plaintiff at all?”).
415. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2012) (corresponds to the amendments to the Securities
Act of 1933 that were contained in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 201, 48
Stat. 881, 905 (exempting intrastate offerings from SEC registration so long as the issuer is
a business organized in the state where its securities are issued and all investors reside in
that state)).
416. “A ‘market maker’ is a firm that stands ready to buy and sell a particular stock on
a regular and continuous basis at a publicly quoted price. You’ll most often hear about
market makers in the context of the Nasdaq or other ‘[OTC] markets.’ ” Market Maker,
SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mktmaker.htm [http://perma.cc/B7SL-ET8Q].
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Ideally, an established market similar to Over-the-CounterBulletin-Boards (“OTCBB”),417 which rely on traders to supply
pricing information,418 or Second Market, where companies can
transact private-placement offerings,419 would be most desirable.420
Once again, either alternative would be limited to intrastate trading
unless one of two things occurs: either the SEC curbs the resale
restriction in the federal exemption421 before finalizing its proposed
rules422 so that securities could be traded on national exchanges; or
Congress modifies the section 3(a) intrastate securities offerings
exemption423 to permit interstate trading in securities issued under
intrastate exemptions.424 Given the dismal prospects of either event
occurring, an intrastate secondary market remains the lone
alternative.
A secondary market for North Carolina crowdfunded securities
would be made possible by vesting intermediaries with discretion to
facilitate interportal, intrastate-crowdfunded securities trading. Under
the section 3(a) intrastate securities offerings exemption,
intermediaries are required to verify that investors are state
residents.425 Once verified, crowdfunded securities could be traded
among investors either within or between portals. Investors would all
have access to the same information posted on each online portal.
417. An OTCBB is “an electronic quotation system that displays real-time quotes, lastsale prices and volume information for many over-the-counter securities that are not listed
on a national securities exchange.” OTC Bulletin Board (OTCBB), SEC, http://www.sec
.gov/answers/otcbb.htm [http://perma.cc/45Q2-4ZPV].
418. Investor Information, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY, http://www.finra.org
/Industry/Compliance/MarketTransparency/OTCBB/ [http://perma.cc/2PKK-ATBX]
(“Subscribing market makers can utilize the OTCBB to enter, update, and display their
proprietary quotations in individual securities on a real-time basis.”).
419. SECOND MARKET, https://www.secondmarket.com/ [http://perma.cc/3ATN-4C29]
(“Our online portal allows private companies and funds to customize, control and
seamlessly execute private securities transactions.”).
420. See Morsy, supra note 398, at 1403 (explaining that allowing for a secondary
market for crowdfunded securities, similar to “Second Market,” is more desirable than a
resale restriction).
421. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(e) (2013).
422. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
200, 227, 232, 239, 240, and 249).
423. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2012).
424. Specifically, both provisions were passed by Congress and are not just SEC
regulations. Also, both the intrastate exemption and the federal crowdsourcing exemption
would be effectively nullified if securities issued under the intrastate exemption were
permitted to be resold on national exchanges—permitting states issuers to circumvent the
federal crowdsourcing regulations by choosing to issue their securities in the state with the
most favorable laws while also transforming such (initially) intrastate offerings into
interstate offerings.
425. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11).
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To stymie investor fraud concerns, funding portals offering a
secondary market feature could impose more stringent requirements
on issuers and investors. Such requirements might include identity
verification, heightened education requirements, and heightened
disclosure requirements on companies seeking to issue tradable
securities.426
Additional technological features could also assist issuers and
investors. For example, Second Market427 permits investors to create
profiles that include information about their investments and
“network[s] of ‘trusted’ investors[,]” provides financial news updates
and “updates on [participants’] investments[,]” and it even offers
“analyst coverage of certain companies.”428 Likewise, provisions in
this proposal noted above, including investor education
requirements429 and social media features that help investors stay
informed,430 will help promote a viable secondary market. A
secondary market option certainly is not a perfect alternative to a
resale restriction. However, by curbing the concerns noted above
without burdening investors with additional risks, it is a superior
alternative.
CONCLUSION
In sum, H.B. 680 was a laudable attempt at a North Carolina
crowdfunding exemption. North Carolina’s lawmakers should go back
to the drawing board and draft a bill that minimizes risks to investors
without overburdening issuers with excessive costs and hurdles. North
Carolina can provide innovative small businesses and startups with
access to the capital they desperately need “by exempting offerings
where the cost of registration clearly exceeds any possible benefits.”431
The provisions recommended in this proposal achieve that
balance. First, they limit potential losses to investors while providing
issuers with sufficient capital to support their startups.432
Furthermore, standardized, useful, and comprehensible disclosures,433

426. Cf. Hazen, supra note 179, at 1754 (discussing the need for greater regulation in
crowdfunding to prevent fraud and investor losses).
427. See supra notes 419–20.
428. Elizabeth Pollman, Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 179,
198–99 (2012).
429. See supra Section VI.E.
430. See LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 388, at 181.
431. Bradford, supra note 48, at 150.
432. See supra Sections VI.A–B.
433. See supra Section VI.D.
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accompanied by the investor education requirements434 provided for
in this proposal, ensure that disclosures achieve their traditional
purposes—enabling investors to make fully informed investments,
while minimizing costs to issuers.435 Moreover, an “all-or-nothing”
provision maintains checks on issuers by incentivizing them to be
more responsive to investor concerns and to engage in more diligent
planning, thus preventing investor losses in undercapitalized
companies.436 This proposal also promotes competition among
intermediaries, who are then incentivized to offer issuers premium
services, to screen issuers, and to offer the best companies on their
websites.437 Requiring intermediaries to absorb some investor losses
in the event of fraud will provide a form of fraud insurance to
investors.438 Finally, loosening H.B. 680’s resale restriction by vesting
intermediaries with discretion to establish interportal, intrastate
secondary markets for crowdfunded securities will improve securities
valuation and improve securities fraud remedies available to
investors.439
Of course, a crowdfunding exemption is not meant to prevent
investor losses in risky startups or ensure a favorable return on
investment. Nor is there an available model that provides an
impenetrable shield against fraud.440 Nonetheless, where North
Carolina is concerned, the uncertainty surrounding equity
crowdfunding will persist until North Carolina begins its own
experiment. The North Carolina legislature should “do better”441 and
prioritize passing its own intrastate equity crowdfunding exemption.

434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.

See supra Section VI.E.
See supra Part II.
See supra Section VI.C.
See supra Section VI.F.
See supra Section VI.F.
See supra Section VI.G.
See supra text accompanying notes 179–81.
Smith, supra note 11.
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Providing equity crowdfunding to North Carolina entrepreneurs
can help create economic growth, job creation, and increased
innovation at minimal cost to taxpayers. Drafting a successful
crowdfunding exemption will focus on providing effective investor
protection without overburdening small businesses and risky startups
with excessive regulation and disclosure requirements. This Comment
proposes provisions to achieve that balance.
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